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SUMMARY
AGENCY AND LIVELIHOOD-MAKING IN PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT \ R. VOLLMER
This project’s approach of analysing protracted displacement through the perspectives and  
experiences of the displaced persons themselves has proven key to understanding the actual  
dynamics, complexities and possible solutions to it. It uncovered and documented a wealth of 
different coping strategies across diverse contexts, thus providing new insights into what living 
in protracted displacement means for people affected by it and into which kind of support they 
require. The project points out new research avenues on protracted displacement, such as the 
impact of social relations and interactions on displaced peoples’ livelihood options—both locally 
and trans-locally—or the various types and patterns of mobility representing livelihood strate-
gies of the displaced.  
People in protracted displacement face multiple exclusions from access to livelihood-sustaining 
resources and services. Such exclusions are not only layered on top of each other in terms of 
generalised marginalisation but can also condition each other, in that a lack of access to certain 
realms of societal life may block access to others. Moreover, this research has found that the living 
conditions of people in protracted displacement often do not improve after the initial emergency 
phase is over; lack of access to vital resources and services may be a constant feature of protracted 
displacement or even become worse over time. Peoples’ de facto (re)integration strategies, i.e. 
livelihood-making in contexts of displacement or return, take place in highly fragmented and 
disintegrated societies and are confronted with deliberately disintegrating forces, such as legal 
exclusion, discrimination and violence.  
National and international legal regulations and government action provide a crucial frame-
work condition for the chances of displaced persons to (re)integrate and can be supportive or 
disruptive. However, their actual effects on the displaced persons and local level are mediated by 
alternative social norms in the respective context and can be stronger or weaker depending on a 
person’s positionality in society.  
Due to the multiple exclusions and insecurities of protracted displacement, the diversification 
and re-combinations of livelihood sources through spatial mobility is one of few chances for  
the displaced to sustain themselves and their families and is thus essential to their livelihoods. 
Mobility is, however, not automatically a resource in itself; it can simply be the permanent 
search for safety and livelihood opportunities. Social relations and interactions at the place of 
residence are perhaps the most important resource for displaced persons’ livelihoods. Pre-existing 
ties between communities often help to facilitate local integration of displaced persons. However, 
a marginal status of local residents, poverty and scarcity of resources in receiving areas and  
external influences can have a negative impact on community relations, lead to tensions and  
reduce livelihood options for the displaced. 
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Spatial mobility and engagement with 
trans-local social networks are two of 
the most important strategies adopted 
by displaced persons to deal with the 
various constraints and uncertainties 
they face to sustain their livelihoods. 
Spatial mobility has emerged not only as a con-
stant feature of protracted internal displacement for 
people who need to flee from the shifting hotspots of  
violence but also as an expression of displaced per-
sons' permanent search for livelihood opportunities 
in exile. 
Receiving communities play a 
crucial role in hosting and supporting 
displaced persons.
Displaced persons and local residents are not ho-
mogenous and static social entities. Local inhabitants 
may also belong to marginalised groups and experi-
ence disruptions of their livelihood, violent conflict or 
may have a history of displacement themselves. Yet, 
across contexts, receiving communities play a crucial 
role in hosting and supporting displaced persons, 
many of whom find shelter in local people’s private 
homes or religious institutions.  
Displacement disrupts and changes 
people’s options to access life- and 
livelihood-sustaining resources and 
services.   
Available livelihood options may change repeat-
edly during protracted displacement, during and after 
return and in cases of renewed displacement. 
The exclusion from resources and  
services that sustain affected groups' 
livelihood often goes along with and is 
enforced by a lack of legal and political 
representation of these groups. 
 
The respective legal and political framework can 
open or close up opportunities for access to work, ser-
vices or a legal status. How legality shapes livelihood 
options is highly dependent on the specific local 
contexts. 
Different immigration and refugee  
policies of inclusion and exclusion do 
not only affect displaced persons but 
often other social groups, too. 
These include recent and long-settled immi-
grants, ethnic minorities, nomads, etc. and often  
interrelate with socio-economic status or class  
dispositions. Legal limitations set by policies in the 
respective destination countries frame but do not 
determine the endeavours of affected persons.
Main findings
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Protracted displacement and failing 
“solutions”
“Protracted displacement is the new normal” 
(CGD-IRC, 2017). This situation currently affects 78 per 
cent of all refugees—that is, around 15 million people—
worldwide (UNHCR, 2019)1  as well as around two-thirds 
or more of the over 40 million people who are dis-
placed within their countries of origin due to armed 
conflicts (Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012, p. 9). UNHCR (2004, 
p. 1) speaks about a protracted refugee situation (PRS) 
when refugees “find themselves in a long-lasting and 
intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at 
risk, but their basic rights and essential economic,  
social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after 
years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often un-
able to break free from enforced reliance on external 
assistance”. It is increasingly recognised that this  
affects people in internal displacement as well (see 
Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012).
Displacement starts with an initial experience of 
expulsion or flight from violence or the threat of vio-
lence. It becomes protracted when displaced persons 
are not able to return to their homes for long and  
unforeseeable periods of time and are forced to stay 
either elsewhere within the country or abroad, facing 
the problems mentioned above. Initial displacement 
may turn into forced immobility, for example, for 
people who are confined to camps for a long period 
of time. Protracted displacement can also appear as 
repeated back-and-forth movements between a safe 
place of staying and an unsafe place of production, 
e.g. in the case of land for cultivation that is located 
in a war zone, when employment is found in large 
cities where there might be higher risks of attacks, or 
when accessing labour markets abroad entails the 
1 \  According to UNHCR and World Bank data, since the mid-1990s, a rather 
stable population of five to seven million refugees has lived in protracted 
refugee situations. The average duration of exile gradually increased 
from around nine years in the early 1990s to over 20 years by the end of 
2015 (Devictor & Do, 2016, p. 16), and in the last few years, the number 
of people affected has more than doubled.
This Synthesis Report summarises the results of 
four years of research (2015–2018) in seven world  
regions where large numbers of people have been liv-
ing in protracted displacement due to armed conflicts. 
With the research project, “Protected rather than pro-
tracted”, BICC aimed to achieve a better understand-
ing of the nature of protracted displacement and the 
strategies displaced persons are using. The findings 
are meant to inform “adapted, participative, coherent 
and sustainable strategies of humanitarian and de-
velopment aid agencies” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 
2018, p. 8). 
The project addressed the following research 
questions:
   \ Which challenges and opportunities can be  
observed during the reintegration of refugees 
and IDPs, and what are the preconditions for 
successful reintegration?
   \ What are the challenges to local integration, 
and which practices of local integration are 
there?
   \ Under which conditions does the participation 
of refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in peace processes play a key role in the 
sustainability of their return and peace?
To answer these three questions, the research  
focused on individual and collective practices of live-
lihood-making in contexts of protracted displacement, 
return, reintegration and local integration. Rather 
than focussing on the classical durable solutions  
of repatriation/reintegration, local integration and 
resettlement, the research shed light on the practices 
and the agency of people living in-between and beyond 
those durable solutions. The specific value of this 
research is that it took into account the heterogeneity 
of displaced people and the disparity of the social 
contexts and structural constraints they live in.
Introduction
“[P]rotracted displacement cannot be understood—much less resolved—without first comprehending the interests 
and hopes that the displaced themselves invest in the idea of ‘solutions’”.
(Long, 2011, p. 3)
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These ‘durable solutions’ comprise the permanent 
return of a person to his or her country of origin, local 
integration in a neighbouring country and their re-
settlement in a third country and form an essential  
part of the humanitarian refugee regime. The under-
lying belief is that each “durable solution restores 
what refugees—by definition—lack: legal and social 
membership in a national community” (Aleinikoff & 
Poellot, 2014, p. 2). 
Yet, this set of durable solutions only works for a 
small share of displaced persons and a lot less than 
those who are newly displaced each year (16.2 million 
in 2017; 13.6 in 2018 according to UNHCR, 2018 & 2019)
   \  Less than 600,000 persons returned to their 
countries of origin in 2018; about 650,000 refu-
gees had returned in 2017. UNHCR stated that 
the circumstances were adverse to reintegra-
tion so that “thresholds for voluntary, safe and 
dignified return” were often not met (2018, p. 28). 
   \  Resettlement to third countries is based on 
official quotas set by governments. Around 
100,000 people were received by third countries 
through this channel in 2017 and above 90,000 
in 2018 (UNHCR, 2019). 
risk of deportation. Moreover, it may become a long 
fragmented journey with repeated expulsions and  
rejections. Over time, not being able to fully arrive  
anywhere becomes characteristic of displaced people 
(Schmalz, 2017, p. 15).
The ever-growing number of displaced persons 
worldwide consists of those who live in protracted 
displacement, including their offspring as well as 
newly displaced persons.2  PRS recognised as such  
by UNHCR range from the Syrian displacement crisis 
with the conflict entering its 8th year in 2019 to  
Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan for around 40 years 
because of recurrent violent conflicts (Devictor & Do, 
2016). 
Research on PRS has often been policy-driven, 
taking a perspective that portrays protracted situations 
as static (e. g. Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, 
2008). Notions like “state of limbo” (UNHCR definition), 
“warehousing of refugees” (Smith, 2004) or “waste of 
human potential” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 2) conceal the 
multiple activities that displaced persons engage in 
to carve out a livelihood. Policy responses tend to 
treat PRS as a temporary phenomenon that can be 
solved via three pathways leading out of displacement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 \  The Annex provides an overview of the changes in the global refugee 
regime and other factors contributing to the growth in protracted  
displacement over time.
Figure 1
Durable solutions for refugees in 2018
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   \  Local integration implies that refugees receive 
the citizenship or a comparable status in the 
country of residence and are able to “pursue 
sustainable livelihoods and contribute to the 
economic life of the host country and live 
among the host population without discrimi-
nation or exploitation” (UNHCR, 2017, p. 30).  
Reliable data on the numbers of locally integrated 
people are not available. In fact, receiving 
countries often constrain or prohibit local inte-
gration so that it does not become a ‘durable 
solution’ according to UNHCR’s definition.
Figure 1 shows the proportions of refugees bene-
fitting from the three durable solutions (UNHCR, 
2019). It reveals that the vast majority of displaced 
people do not have access to any of them. Instead, 
they lead their lives under conditions of protracted 
displacement. Understanding the ‘normalcy’ of living 
and livelihood-making under such conditions was the 
aim of the empirical studies conducted within the 
research project “Protected rather than protracted”. 
Structure of the Report
This Report first highlights our research approach 
and key terms (cf. project publications, Annex: Table 4). 
A brief overview of the empirical study sites follows. 
The key findings from a comparative analysis of the 
research3  in seven world regions are then presented 
in four chapters, complemented by recommenda-
tions for action addressed to humanitarian and de-
velopment agencies. The first chapter highlights the 
research results on displaced people’s access to basic 
livelihood necessities (food, land, housing, health  
services, education and income opportunities). The 
second chapter presents the findings on displaced 
people’s access to a legal status and documents and 
how this relates to possibilities for claiming rights 
and political participation. The third chapter outlines 
the main findings relating to the particular liveli-
hood and coping strategies that displaced persons 
employ to manage a life characterised by uncertainty. 
3 \  Detailed and comprehensive accounts of the findings from each region 
studied are accessible in Working Papers, Policy Briefs and Journal  
Articles at https://www.bicc.de/research-clusters/project/project/pro-
tected-rather-than-protracted-strengthening-refugees-and-peace-122/
The fourth chapter presents the research results re-
garding the diversity and heterogeneity of displaced 
people / returnees as well as local residents and ex-
plains how social relations in contexts of protracted 
displacement and return shape livelihood options. 
The final chapter highlights two new approaches 
that the international community introduced during 
the project period (2015–2018) that will have a signifi-
cant impact on the international refugee regime—
the pilot phase of the Comprehensive Refugee  
Response Framework (CRRF) and the EU–Jordan 
Compact. Based on first experiences with these two 
instruments, the Report presents lessons that can be 
learned to improve such interventions in the future. 
Project approach and key definitions
From the outset, the research project stressed the 
‘process’ character of protracted displacement. It 
avoided taking protracted displacement as a static 
‘situation’ but considered it as a set of actions and  
dynamics that developed over the long period of time 
during which persons remain displaced. The research 
interest was to explore the strategic choices of dis-
placed people—for example, to generate and diversify 
income sources—and the social local and trans-local 
networks4  they established under challenging condi-
tions. Activities and choices were, therefore, at the 
heart of this research endeavour while always con-
sidering contextual and structural constraints to 
them, too. This focus was captured by the notion of 
agency which means, in a nutshell, the ability of a 
person to act. Agency encompasses “the possible  
scope of action as a function of (a person’s) … own  
capacities vs. desires on the one hand and the exter-
nal structural factors framing his or her everyday  
existence on the other” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 9). 
4 \  The term ‘trans-local’ (networks or relations) signifies network rela-
tions between individuals at several locations which potentially trans-
gress international borders but might also be limited to one nation- 
state context. Any displacement (whether internal or across borders) 
exposes displaced persons to new contexts and experiences that can 
transform the individual or family and other social grouping. The 
‘local’ in the term ‘trans-local’ stresses that agency takes place in a 
local context (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). The use of ‘trans-local’ does not 
contradict scholarly work that prefers to use the term ‘trans-national’ 
to highlight the cross-border dimension of displaced persons relation-
ships (Harpviken, 2014; Rouse, 1991; Monsutti, 2005).
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The ‘external structural factors’ range from legal, po-
litical and economic framework conditions to imme-
diate social group dynamics (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). 
For displaced people, in particular, the existing (and 
changing) refugee policies, the policies towards inter-
nally displaced people (IDPs) and towards so-called 
‘irregular migrants’—who are often (undocumented) 
displaced people, too—, are important framework 
conditions that constrain or widen their agency. This 
definition of agency enabled the researchers to con-
sider the different positionalities and to analyse how 
the socio-economic status of a person framed an in-
dividual’s aspirations and opportunities before, dur-
ing and after forced displacement.
Crises causing protracted displacement are hard-
ly ever limited to individual states. Therefore, this re-
search took a regional and trans-local approach, enabling 
the researchers to capture perspectives and practices 
of displaced persons in contexts of refuge, return, 
transit, forced (im)mobility and local integration. 
This justifies once again the focus on the process di-
mension of displacement and return, i.e. their contin-
gency and non-linearity, by which this research pro-
ject contrasts the commonly found rather static and 
linear accounts (Bohnet, Mielke, Rudolf, Schetter & 
Vollmer, 2015). The process-oriented perspective also 
entailed embedding the research in a historically based 
understanding of conflict and inter-group dynamics. 
Key definitions of terms
This project defines protracted displacement as a 
condition where people themselves or previous  
generations in their families have experienced forced 
displacement at least once and have to deal with  
partial or total exclusion from essential livelihood- 
sustaining aspects of social life as a result thereof. 
This definition comprises all persons who are unable 
to re-access losses (such as human rights and dignity, 
homes, properties, livelihoods and others) after  
displacement and includes persons born into such 
conditions. The term ‘protracted displacement’ 
 
 
(differently from PRS) thus includes displaced persons 
regardless of their legal status. It covers not only those 
in camps, detention centres and official statistics but 
also those who self-settled in urban or rural spaces 
inside or outside their countries of origin. Moreover, 
it comprises people who are hiding, in transit or  
permanently moving between places, including  
(repeated) attempts of return and those subjected  
to secondary or multiple displacements. Thus, our 
understanding of protracted displacement captures 
dynamics like the very common turnovers among 
registered population groups as well as the mobility 
of displaced persons. 
Protracted displacement in this understanding 
can best be captured as life in liminality, where peo-
ple are systematically subjected to marginalising and 
excluding forces. Importantly, it is not people’s long-
term physical dislocation per se, which defines pro-
tracted displacement, but the multiple exclusions, in-
securities and denials of rights they have to deal with, 
given that these continue to shape their livelihood 
for long and unforeseeable time periods (cf. Long, 
2014), often also during onward mobility or return.5  
These define the framework conditions under which 
displaced people, through their agency, manage to 
(partially) participate in the social, economic and  
political life around them and unlock livelihood op-
portunities, often in their immediate social environ-
ments and/or through trans-local connections.  
Focussing on people’s agency under these challenging 
conditions allowed the researchers to approach pro-
tracted displacement not as a state of exception or 
transition, but as a social phenomenon in its own 
right.
The term displaced persons (DPs) denotes persons 
who regard themselves as forcibly displaced. The 
term emphasises the experience of forced displace-
ment as the starting point of analysis. As large num-
bers of people are born into protracted displacement, 
it can also be the forced displacement of their parents 
or grandparents that still defines their living condi-
tions. Hence, the research approach did not  
 
5 \  Exclusion from livelihood-sustaining resources and rights is often 
shared between displaced persons, parts of the residential population 
and immobilised groups, like displaced-in-place, who are prevented 
from escaping dangerous conditions by armed groups.
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adopt legal categories as units of analysis (refugees, 
IDPs, people in refugee-like situations, stateless and/
or undocumented persons, labour and educational 
migrants, etc.). Instead, the approach took into ac-
count that the legal status is attributed to a person 
after movement (across a border, within a country, to 
a camp, etc.)6  and that the allocation of legal catego-
ries may follow politically motivated criteria.7  Rather 
than defining the field of research (refugee studies, 
IDP studies, migration studies), the legal categories 
were taken as a subject of research. This allowed for 
critical reflections on the interrelation of everyday  
realities of displaced persons and national as well as 
international refugee policies (Rudolf & Schmitz- 
Pranghe, 2018). 
Due to the focus on DPs’ agency during the pro-
cess of protracted displacement, the units of analysis 
were individuals and groups, who perceived them-
selves as experiencing protracted displacement,  
selected according to the principle of maximal struc-
tural variation. Therefore, all the legal categories  
occurred in the sample, but beyond that, the research 
included groups not covered by any of them and  
accounted for the fact that individuals may belong 
to different legal categories over time. 
Beyond DPs, the project examined the lives and 
livelihoods of local residents, as these become affected 
in various ways when large numbers of newcomers 
or returnees move into an area and possibly receive 
international assistance. Many regions and countries 
6 \  The distinction between refugees and IDPs is owed to the role of states 
as sovereign subjects in international law, leading to different legal 
regimes for the two categories of displaced people. The ideal-typical 
distinction between refugees and migrants relates to how compelling 
the drivers to leave were: Refugees flee from a threat or fear of physical 
violence against themselves, close relatives or their property and expe-
rience a rupture in the relationship between their status as citizens 
and the state or government. Migrants are those who have left for all 
other reasons (Grawert, 2018). The long-standing debate between schol-
ars suggesting to subsume refugees and IDPs under ‘migration’—in 
this case caused by conflict (for example Van Hear, Bakewell & Long, 
2017)—and scholars arguing that a refugee is qualitatively different 
from a migrant, because the movement was caused by “a break of a 
basic relationship between state and citizen”(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 
Loescher, Long & Sigona, 2014, p. 4) cannot be unraveled in this context.
7 \  States have very different, sometimes arbitrary and sometimes no 
mechanisms at all to grant individuals refugee status. Also, a legal  
status can be withdrawn, for example to compel people to return  
before the causes of displacement have been overcome, which leaves 
people no less displaced, but without being recognised as such.
that receive displaced persons are ethnically and so-
cially diverse so that the arrival of a high number of 
displaced persons can affect a delicate social balance. 
Some receiving societies have a history of armed con-
flict, and the inhabitants have faced economic, envi-
ronmental or other hardships before the arrival of 
displaced people. Parts of the residential population 
may already consist of immigrants or DPs. Last but 
not least, the capacity and willingness of the govern-
ment to provide material resources, services and  
protection to its citizens, to its population or only to 
parts thereof are crucial determinants of living con-
ditions of both, the displaced and local residents. 
Thus, characteristics of persons in protracted dis-
placement, such as a lack of rights, perspectives and 
security (Loescher, Milner, Newman & Troeller, 2007) 
may equally apply to (some or large) parts of the resi-
dential population. In other contexts, there may be 
clear distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, 
such as high hurdles or lack of access for non-citi-
zens to the formal labour market (Betts, Bloom, 
Kaplan & Omata, 2017, p. 201). This project, therefore, 
included the border- and boundary-making between 
displaced people and communities receiving them in 
its empirical research and avoided replicating the 
common refugee–host-dichotomy.8 
The project dissected the social context of displace-
ment and return according to different levels and scales, 
as displacement affects individuals, households, com-
munities, municipalities, other local institutions, the 
larger society as well as the state and government in 
different ways. Interactions of the respective actors 
with the displaced people and their contributions to 
accommodating displaced persons or returnees tend 
to differ between these levels (Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 22). 
Moreover, among the groups that have not fled, 
there may be people who are unable to move despite 
being confronted with violence that drives others 
into displacement, e.g. ‘trapped communities’ (Black 
& Collyer, 2014) or ‘displaced-in-place’ (Lubkemann, 
2008). Their situation might be more akin to the DPs 
than to residents who have not been affected by 
armed conflict (cf. Rudolf, 2019b). The holistic 
8 \  “Displacement-affected communities” has been introduced as a term 
to address displaced and local inhabitants together (ReDSS, 2018, p. 5).
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research approach that tried to shed light on all fac-
ets of protracted displacement hence also included 
such groups of ‘non-displaced persons’. 
Across all case studies of this project, protracted 
armed conflict was the main driving force that pushed 
people into displacement and prevented them  
from returning in safety for long periods. Frequent  
re-occurrences of violence,  disparate regional devel-
opments within countries (e.g. between the ‘centre’ 
and the ‘periphery’) and increased control of non-
state armed groups over certain areas ‘post-conflict’ 
are much more likely than a linear transition from 
war to peace. Frequently, this is linked to the continu-
ation of the war-time economy whose beneficiaries 
defend their territories, or the establishment of a  
repressive or sectarian system of governance by the 
winning party. Conflict lines and regional hotspots  
of violence shift rather than disappear during a per-
ceived ‘end of war’, and impunity for the perpetrators 
of violent acts as well as systematic extrajudicial kill-
ings often persist after the fighting ceased. Protracted 
violent conflicts are therefore conceptualised as pro-
cesses that oscillate between so-called peace and war 
(Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 24).9  The focus of the research 
was on displacement caused by such violent conflicts 
and political factors like persecution and state re-
pression. Displacement mainly caused by natural  
desasters, environmental degradation or develop-
ment projects was not included.
Due to the protracted nature of conflicts and  
displacement, local integration is the option most  
commonly available to DPs. However, de jure local 
integration, defined as the successive granting of rights 
and opportunities by the government of the receiving 
country—such as political, economic, social and  
cultural rights—ideally culminating in the granting 
of citizenship (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019) is 
hardly ever achieved. Often, these rights are deliber-
ately restricted in the receiving country context. 
 
9 \  This project hence does not subscribe to any dichotomy between vio-
lent and civilian actors / perpetrators and victims. It also does not take 
up categorisations of countries into ‘peace’, ‘war’ or ‘post-conflict’ as 
these are often misleading. For example, the number of homicides in 
countries considered to be ‘at peace’ (e.g. in Central America) can be 
higher than in countries at war (Rudolf, 2019b).
Against this backdrop, this research focused on de 
facto local integration.
De facto local integration is defined here as DPs’ 
own, individual or collective, strategies to make a liv-
ing through accessing the political, social, economic, 
legal and cultural options existing at their place or 
places of residence. The degree to which this is possi-
ble varies widely and sometimes benefits from DPs’ 
trans-local connections. De facto local integration 
hence is a “somewhat informal, limited everyday 
practice” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 7.). The 
project emphasised the process-nature of integration 
rather than some kind of end-result of ‘successful 
integration’. De facto integration hence does not fulfil 
the criterion of being a ‘durable solution’, but de-
scribes coping strategies of displaced persons under 
the condition of continuing displacement, which can 
involve setbacks, ruptures and changes of plan. Un-
like de jure local integration, which builds on ‘national’ 
belonging or an official acknowledgement by the 
state through a political and formalised process, de 
facto local integration is very much about the place(s) 
and the social context(s) displaced persons find them-
selves in (Kuch, 2016, p. 474). As a result of mobility or 
trans-local connections, this type of local integration 
may take place in more than one place at a time. 
Despite significant obstacles to safe return and 
numerous failed or premature return programmes, 
repatriation is considered the ‘preferred durable solu-
tion’ (see Annex for the changing prioritisation of 
durable solutions over time). However, the number  
of people who return is small compared to those who 
are newly displaced or stuck in protracted displace-
ment, and in many cases, return is not durable. Due 
to a lack of long-term data on return and reintegra-
tion, the proportions of temporary and permanent  
return are unknown. 
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In sum, this project aimed to overcome the ‘sed-
entary bias’ inherent in classic definitions of durable 
solutions (cf. Bakewell, 2008) and it also did not con-
sider local integration and reintegration as mutually 
exclusive. On the contrary, we acknowledged that 
both processes may coincide and support each other. 
Importantly, neither local integration nor reintegra-
tion are linear processes leading to a better life. There 
may well be contexts where the situation of displaced 
persons was a lot better during displacement than 
before displacement or after return (Bohnet, 2016, p. 12).
 
Analytical framework
To understand the impact of protracted displace-
ment on people in different contexts, this research 
initially focused on the question of which resources, 
means of participation and realms of social life dis-
placed persons had access to. Rather than focusing on 
legal entitlements, which should come with certain 
rights or benefits, attention was paid to de facto access.10 
As an entry point, the project applied (and successively 
extended) the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction 
Model (IRR) (see Cernea, 2000) to trace the impover-
ishment risks people in protracted displacement and 
their resident neighbours were facing across the dif-
ferent contexts. The model contains risks ranging 
from the loss of physical security to the loss of educa-
tion opportunities.11  The project team complemented 
the IRR model according to new insights from field 
research and included the loss of protection, depriva-
tion of political participation, human rights and 
voice (see points a, l, m, and n in Box 1). The extended 
IRR model includes the risks to be prevented as well 
as risk reversal strategies for each aspect. 
10 \  Following Ribot & Peluso (2003), access is defined as the ability (and 
hence power) to benefit from a certain resource in the widest sense, i.e. 
not only concerning material resources, but also different rights, such 
as civil and political rights.
11 \  Initially, the IRR was developed and tested for application in the  
context of development-induced relocations during the 1990s. Then 
the model was adapted to measure and potentially reverse impover-
ishment risks of people after conflict-induced displacement and  
subsequent return (IDMC, 2010). Its underlying assumption is that 
resources or capital in the broadest sense are usually place-bound and 
can thus become unavailable due to displacement. The ensuing impov-
erishment risks are understood as a loss of natural capital, human- 
made physical capital, human capital and social capital (Kälin & 
Schrepfer, 2012, p. 4).
The project considered reintegration after return 
to the country of origin as a new beginning and a 
process as drawn-out and complex as integration in a 
new place (Bohnet et al., 2015). People may settle in a 
place other than their previous home. After decades 
of displacement, new generations have been raised in 
exile and have never seen their ‘country of origin’. 
Livelihood opportunities and legal, political, economic, 
social and cultural conditions may have changed tre-
mendously due to the conflict. Antagonistic identity 
dynamics between returnees and those people who 
never left may emerge (cf. Warner, 1994). In short: 
While repatriation as official durable solution is 
achieved by simply crossing the border, return is  
not just a reversal of displacement. Many returnees, 
therefore, move on or become displaced again  
(Bohnet et al., 2015, p. 24). For this reason, the project 
looked at reintegration as a gradual and largely 
self-organised process and examined the everyday 
practices applied by returnees to establish and  
increase livelihood options. 
Humanitarian and development agencies usually 
do not distinguish between de jure and de facto rein-
tegration since returnees are considered de jure rein-
tegrated through their citizenship. However, scholars 
emphasised that reintegration requires a political 
community, which returnees can reintegrate into 
with all their rights as citizens (Long, 2013), which is 
not automatically given. Just like IDPs, displaced-in-
place, members of minorities or indigenous groups, 
many returnees make the experience that their de 
jure citizenship does not entail the willingness or  
capacity of the government to protect or even respect 
their rights as citizens. The fact that returnees and 
IDPs have de jure full access to citizenship rights 
while people who are displaced and stay outside of 
their countries of origin are subjected to legal con-
straints and exclusions as non-citizens may or may 
not affect their livelihood options differently, depend-
ing on the context. Due to the similarities in having 
to establish a new livelihood—whether when inte-
grating elsewhere after displacement or after return—, 
this project subsumes both under the term (re)inte-
gration where appropriate.
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To go beyond the deprivation that displaced people 
face, the project applied an analytical livelihood  
approach and adapted it to contexts of protracted dis-
placement (Grawert & Mielke, 2018; Grawert, 2019c). 
This approach also allowed the researchers to under-
stand who or what shapes, restricts or mediates a 
(lack of) access to livelihoods and which strategies 
displaced persons apply to overcome constraints and 
risks. The approach is based on the assumption that 
it is the “secure control by the people over resources 
that can provide them with adequate livelihoods” 
(Chambers, 1988, p. 11). Both the concepts of ‘access’ 
and ‘livelihood’ emphasise power relations. As indi-
viduals are part of social relations in which power 
manifests itself, they rely on bundles of power to 
claim and enforce access. This can explain differential 
access patterns and their dynamics (Ribot & Peluso, 
2003, p. 158; Mielke, 2015). With its broad notion of  
access (access to and control over resources) and the 
broad definition of resources, which includes social 
capital (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 51), the analytical 
livelihood approach ties in well with the IRR, but also 
goes beyond it in several crucial points. 
1\ It defines a livelihood as “maintaining a way of 
life” in the sense that ensures bearing “a life in 
dignity according to the particular social group’s 
own measure” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 9). The 
concept thus extends beyond basic needs and  
includes people’s own (social, cultural) values and 
preferences. 
2\ The concept establishes that securing one’s own 
or a family’s livelihood requires the agency of a 
collective, like a family or extended family, and 
thus emphasises the strategies individuals and 
groups apply towards their own ends. 
3\ Rather than taking the legal, political, social or 
economic structures as given constraints towards 
people’s scope of action, it puts people and “their 
perceptions of constraints and opportunities in 
the centre” (Grawert, 2019c, p. 10). It thus provides 
a comprehensive and suitable framework to 
“analyse hardships and coping strategies of dis-
placed persons and contribute to the debate on 
solutions to protracted displacement situations 
(PDS) by focusing on perspectives of agency of the 
displaced persons” (Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 
2018, p. 7). 
4\ The range of activities people engage in to retain 
or regain their “way of life” is related to the social 
environment and social interaction (Grawert & 
Mielke, 2018). The project incorporated the “estab-
lished-outsider figuration” (Elias & Scotson, 2013) 
to study the social interaction and interrelations 
of displaced persons with the receiving commu-
nities, examine the repercussions on livelihood 
options and explain difficulties in processes of 
(re)integration (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 54). 
5\ Agency is influenced by attributes of positionality 
(age, gender, socio-economic status, ethnic be-
longing, education, legal status/citizenship, expe-
rience of voluntary or involuntary return or mi-
gration, etc.) (Grawert & Mielke, 2018, p. 11). In 
particular lower-class groups encounter exclu-
sionary practices when trying to organise their 
Box 1  
Impoverishment risks of displaced persons and reversal 
strategies
a) Unprotrected  protected
a) Landlessness   land-based resettlement 
b) Joblessness  (re)employment
c) Homelessness  house reconstruction
d) Marginalisation  social inclusion
e) Food insecurity  adequate nutrition
f) Increased morbidity  improved healthcare
g) Loss of common  Restauration of community  
property   assets and services
h) Social disarticulation  (re)building of networks and 
   communities, reconciliation 
i) Loss of educational  restoration of access to education 
opportunities
j) Outlawed  access to legal representation and  
   law enforcement
k) Voiceless  access to political recognition and   
   representation
l) Undocumented  holding valid legal documents,  
   property titles, certificates 
m) Unaware  empowered awareness of (human)  
   rights
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displacement across the case study regions as well as 
within the countries of origin of DPs. The regions in 
focus (other than Upper Guinea Coast) all consist of 
the main conflict country and one or several neigh-
bouring countries accommodating the majority of 
the displaced people. 
In Myanmar, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Burundi 
and Colombia, armed conflicts have been going on for 
several decades, producing large numbers of IDPs, 
refugees and returnees over time. In all four cases, 
there were high-profile events promising peace and 
stability (democratic elections and a ceasefire agree-
ment in Myanmar, the overthrow of the Taliban gov-
ernment in Afghanistan, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in Sudan and subsequent independence 
of South Sudan, the Peace Agreement between the 
Colombian government and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia–FARC). These agreements 
and interventions increased the pressure on the DPs 
to return but at the same time failed to end armed  
violence or did so only temporarily. Regardless of the 
continuing violence and lack of physical safety, in 
three of these four regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iran; Myanmar, Thailand; South Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Uganda) processes of return, mostly self-organised 
and often temporary, both from inside the conflict 
countries as well as from abroad, were observed.  
Simultaneously, there were processes of de facto local 
integration of DPs, sometimes with onward or circu-
lar mobility and new and repeated displacements. In 
the northern South America region (Colombia, Ecua-
dor), part of the research focused on trapped commu-
nities in Colombia, i. e. those unable to flee from areas 
experiencing high levels of violence. Research in all 
four regions confirmed that intensity and scale of  
violence varies in time and space transcending any 
clear delineation between war and peace. 
Research in the Middle Eastern region (Jordan, 
Turkey, Iraq) concentrated on the receiving countries 
of Syrian displaced people who stayed in protracted 
displacement outside Syria and examined the local 
integration of Syrians in the neighbouring countries. 
Part of the research also covered previously displaced 
people from Iraq and Palestine and established how 
the experience of previous displacement shaped their 
livelihoods, so that a livelihood analysis needs to 
consider power relations and impeding struc-
tures for different groups and individuals. Social 
class is thus a “determining factor for the extent 
and quality to which livelihood can be secured … 
(It) contains power relations that establish and 
consolidate inequality in ownership and access 
to land, capital, influential positions and sus-
tained employment” (Grawert & Mielke, 2018,  
p. 11). Whereas some of the case studies explicitly 
undertook to “establish the influence of so-
cio-economic class dispositions on the displaced 
persons’ ability and agency” (Grawert & Mielke, 
2018, p. 1), other case studies confirmed the rele-
vance of the socio-economic background and  
positionality for the livelihood of displaced  
people and the social dynamics they were part of 
(Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019; Rudolf & 
Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018). 
Study regions
The research covered seven world regions over a 
period of four years: 
   \ Upper Guinea Coast (Sierra Leone, Liberia)
   \ West Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran)
   \ Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand)
   \ Northern South America (Colombia, Ecuador)
   \ Eastern Africa (South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia)
   \ Great Lakes Region (Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya)
   \ Middle East ((Syria,) Jordan, Turkey, northern 
Iraq).
The researchers visited each region several times 
and supervised continuous research by trained local 
assistants. One of the regions, Upper Guinea Coast 
(Sierra Leone, Liberia), had been at peace for more 
than 15 years, and most of the formerly displaced  
people have returned long ago. Therefore, this was the 
only case that offered the researchers the opportunity 
to draw lessons regarding the reintegration process 
in hindsight. In all other regions, the factors that 
caused the displacement are still present or have 
been substituted or added upon by more recent ones. 
Protracted conflicts formed the backdrop of 
AGENCY AND LIVELIHOOD-MAKING IN PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT \ R. VOLLMER
16 \ \ WORKING PAPER 10  \ 2019
Methods of field research
The research methodology was largely qualitative 
and field-work based. Data was collected through in-
depth and narrative interviews, which included the 
use of semi-structured interview guidelines for dif-
ferent target groups where appropriate, focus group 
discussions, participant and on-the-spot observation 
and visual documentation. The research team con-
ducted interviews and focus group discussions with 
displaced persons and returnees, stayees and local 
residents, former fighters, government authorities in 
charge of refugees, IDPs and returnees, local academ-
ics and other experts, as well as representatives of na-
tional and international organisations. The approach 
interaction with the more recently displaced Syrians 
taking refuge in Palestinian Jordanian and Iraqi 
communities. Another part of the research investi-
gated how displaced Syrians and Iraqi IDPs experi-
enced the conditions of de facto autonomy in northern 
Iraq some 15 years after the violent and externally  
induced regime change and civil war(s) in Iraq.  
Extensive research in receiving areas not only in the 
Middle East, but also in Eastern Africa (Uganda), the 
Great Lakes Region (Tanzania), Thailand and northern 
South America (Ecuador) allowed the project team to 
uncover the similarities and differences of displaced 
persons’ livelihood strategies and the social contexts 
they encounter across very different political, geo-
graphical and conflict settings.
Box 2 
Protected rather than protracted—Strengthening refugees and peace: Areas of study
Under Research
Country borders
Colombia       
Ecuador
Ethiopia 
South Sudan
Uganda
Kenya
Burundi
Tanzania
  Sierra Leone
  Liberia
Iran
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Myanmar
Thailand
 Turkey
 Iraq
 Syria
 Jordan
Source: Natural Earth 2016.  Map Layout: Marianne Wargenau, Fabian Schmidt 
The boundaries and names shown do not imply of�icial endorsement or acceptance by BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion), the authors, or partners. BICC. September 2018
Protected rather than protracted - Strengthening refugees and peace
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taken was dialogue-oriented and participatory. The 
researchers organised workshops in the field before-
hand to discuss the research approach and focus with 
relevant actors and again at the end of the fieldwork 
to discuss the preliminary findings with stakehold-
ers in each country or region.  
Randomisation of interview partners and repre-
sentative sampling proved difficult for different rea-
sons. In some cases, the security situation was very 
challenging, e.g. in South Sudan and Afghanistan. 
Also, in different research settings, village heads,  
refugee councils or aid organisations presented a 
pre-selection of interview partners. In all case studies, 
however, maximal structural variation and diversity 
of interviewees was emphasised (regarding age, gen-
der, religion, ethnic belonging, socio-economic situa-
tion, rural vs. urban, camp and non-camp, legal status 
and composition of the population in the respective 
study areas). The team triangulated perspectives with 
the help of research assistants, expert interviews, 
workshops with stakeholders and interview partners 
to gather feedback on findings and impressions, 
country-specific secondary data, academic and grey 
literature (Bohnet & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019, p. 12;  
Rudolf & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2018, p. 10-12). Generally, 
the research was based on close cooperation with  
local research assistants, who were first trained and 
then constantly supervised during the research  
process. As to location, the researchers followed a 
multi-sited and regional approach, guided by DPs and 
members of receiving communities and their trans- 
local networks in as well as outside of camps and  
settlements. The approach was continuously adjusted 
according to the feedback and results from all team 
members. A systematic serendipity routine to collect 
and process information outside of the box was in-
cluded. This participative and dialogical research 
provides representative, ideal-typical cases without 
claiming statistical representativeness. Finally, in 
line with the grounded methodology approach,  
preliminary results were regularly acknowledged and 
integrated into the research design. Thematic coding 
and content analysis were most commonly used to 
analyse the data collected.
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displacement and after return. It also accounts for 
the fact that social relations and interactions have 
emerged as one of the strongest of displaced persons’ 
livelihood options, both facilitating and potentially 
constraining them. 
All four empirical chapters are based on a thorough 
comparative assessment of the empirical findings 
from all case studies, which have been collected, 
structured thematically and then analysed for simi-
larities and differences. For reasons of space, only the 
generalised findings and recommendations resulting 
from this process are presented here. For a more 
detailed understanding of the situation in each of the 
case study regions, we recommend the published 
case study findings, which are all made available 
here: https://www.bicc.de/research-clusters/project/
project/protected-rather-than-protracted-strength-
ening -refugees-and-peace-122/
The following four chapters present the main 
findings of this extensive research structured the-
matically and list the key recommendations for ac-
tion emanating from them for each subject. Themati-
cally, the structure of this overview reflects the 
dimensions, which have been identified as relevant 
to the livelihood-making of people in protracted dis-
placement and return as outlined in the analytical 
framework above (i.e. drawing on the Impoverish-
ment Risk and Reconstruction Model complemented 
by findings from this project’s case studies). Accord-
ingly, the first chapter draws together findings re-
garding people’s access to basic livelihood necessities 
like security, food, land and housing, basic services 
(health and education) as well as work. The aim was 
to analyse which livelihood options people managed 
to retain or regain under conditions of protracted  
displacement, which options they lacked and how 
the options of local residents were affected by dis-
placement. The second empirical chapter provides an 
overview of findings on access to political participation, 
awareness of and opportunities to claim rights as 
well as access to valid documents. This chapter sum-
marises findings on how political framework condi-
tions, legality and access to justice shape livelihood 
options of people in different contexts. The third  
empirical chapter presents findings and recommen-
dations on additional livelihood and coping strate-
gies that displaced persons have been found to em-
ploy, including mobility, self-organisation, adaptation 
and various ways of dealing with the question 
whether and when to return. Thus it adds results 
which have been gained through the focus on agency 
and livelihood-making and which are not covered in 
any of the other chapters. In the fourth empirical 
chapter, the report provides main findings on the  
social context of displacement, regarding (a) the  
diversity and heterogeneity of the displaced/returnees 
themselves and (b) their social environment. This 
chapter thus accounts for the dimension of (over-
coming) social disarticulation from the IRR table and 
combines this with the question of displaced persons’ 
positionality in their social environment and how 
these influence livelihood options during 
Overview of main findings and recommendations
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As Naila’s story below illustrates, displacement 
disrupts and changes people’s options to access life- 
and livelihood-sustaining resources and services,  
often in the long run. The available livelihood options 
may repeatedly change during protracted displace-
ment, during and after return and in cases of renewed 
displacement. This chapter provides an overview of the 
findings on displaced people’s access to: a) physical 
security; b) food, land, housing; c) basic services like 
education and health care, as well as d) income  
opportunities and employment, following the dimen-
sions outlined in the analytical framework. It thus 
Empirical findings:  
Impacts of protracted displacement
Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
A long history of mobility and displacement 
Naila*, 60 years old,  
unemployed, Kabul, Afghanistan
Naila, 60, lives in an unofficial settlement in an  
industrial area in Kabul—together with another  
150 families or so. She came to Kabul in 2010 with 
her ageing husband and two sons where she joined 
her relatives, who had come from Pakistan and other 
parts of Afghanistan and settled on unregistered plots 
owned by the Ministry of Finance. “Police had  driven 
us away from our previous settlement across the 
road. But here, too, we are in perpetual fear of being 
forcibly removed”, Naila explains.  
Naila has a long history of mobility and displacement. 
She and her family fled to Kunduz from their home 
north of Kabul during the civil war (1992–1996).  
Mujahidin fighters came to the house and forced the 
men to join the jihad. “Two brothers and one of my 
nephews were killed in the war. Together with the 
rest of the family, I fled to northern Kabul”. During the 
Taliban rule (1996–2001), her husband did every kind 
of casual work, whereas she grew vegetables on the 
land of other people. During winter, the family would 
move close to Jalalabad to find small jobs, and dur-
ing summer back to northern Kabul and up to Parwan 
and Kapisa provinces where they would work on the 
fields of other people, living in a tent. 
Under President Hamid Karzai (2004–2014), the war 
between the US-led coalition forces that supported 
the Afghan Army and the Taliban and mujahidin fight-
ers intensified and reached Kapisa, where Naila was 
injured during a bomb attack. The family fled to Kabul.
“My sons wash cars along the main road near the 
camp to make some money. Workers from the nearby 
carwash centre repeatedly called the police, beat the 
boys and warned them not to do it again. Once they 
stabbed my son and injured him badly”, she explains 
and continues: “Drug addicts come and fight with our 
youth. It is not a safe area to live in. They do not allow 
us to build our houses here. When we repair the walls 
after rain, neighbours come here and beat us. I am not 
feeling safe here. We are living in a bad situation”. 
Naila complains: “There are no job opportunities for 
my sons. The government should provide places  
for work, vocational training, for example, tailoring.  
I am old, but I want my sons to have a better life in  
the future”. During the election campaign, Ashraf 
Ghani had promised that the refugees could stay  
on their land legally. “Why did he lie?”, she asks.  
“He made a promise but did not do anything”.
* name changed
Tehran
Sirjan
Mashhad
Herat Kabul
Islamabad
Karachi
Lahore
Doha
Abu Dhabi
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CHINA
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Source: The Humanitarian Data Exchange 2016.  Map layout: Marianne Wargenau, Hannes Blitza, September 2017
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Naila, a woman from Afghanistan (l.), and Elke Grawert, researcher. BICC \ S. Ehsas
©BICC
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Recommendations for action
   \  Regularly assess the protection needs of people in pro-
tracted displacement. Border areas and camps, as 
well as communities with a large proportion of 
DPs, require particular attention, preparedness 
and rapid assistance or evacuation when vio-
lent attacks increase.
   \  Prevent sexual and gender-based violence by intro-
ducing particular protection measures for threatened 
groups of DPs. Camps, in particular, are places 
that attract sexual violence due to the (long-
term) congestion, physical settings that are not 
culturally embedded, and living conditions 
that encourage the transgression of culturally- 
informed gender-related protection measures. 
Therefore, camps must be rapidly disbanded 
and DPs must be assisted in settling (at least 
temporarily) among local inhabitants besides 
establishing transitional protection of endan-
gered DPs that should be adjusted to the specific 
needs and changes of context, based on a  
participatory process.
   \  Offer alternatives for DPs threatened by forced  
relocation and negotiate with governments to avoid 
mass deportation into unsafe areas. Humanitarian 
protection must have priority in situations 
where armed groups or government forces  
coerce DPs into moving to unsafe areas or 
countries of origin. Pogroms, ethnic cleansing, 
making DPs the scapegoat for economic prob-
lems and social tensions are among the main 
causes of coercive relocation. These problems 
need to be addressed and the required support 
provided early on so that DPs do not become 
threatened. Tripartite agreements between  
UNHCR , the country of origin of DPs and the 
receiving countries are the framework for solu-
tions; however, rapid assistance also needs to 
be prepared for before DPs are forced to move 
into life-threatening conditions.
moves from a focus on access (or lack of access) to the 
most basic requirements for survival like security, 
food and shelter to access to services, which can help 
to overcome the conditions of protracted displacement 
in the longer term. Finally, it summarises findings on 
income-generation opportunities, which are key to 
achieving self-reliance. Drawing on the comparative 
analysis of the research results, the chapter carves 
out what it means for people to live in protracted  
displacement by looking at the livelihood options 
they manage to retain or regain and the exclusions 
they face. It also looks at how livelihood options of 
local residents are affected.   
Access to physical security: Key insights
   \  The loss of physical safety and security is not 
only the main driver that induces displace-
ment; lack of safety continues during protracted 
displacement and after return, takes different 
forms, and may become more or less pressing 
over time. Most common forms of unsafety 
during displacement stem from sexual and 
gender-based violence, armed groups attacking 
refugee or IDP camps, forced recruitment of 
minors and youth into armed groups and 
forced relocation or deportation to the still  
unsafe areas of DPs’ origin.
   \  Conflict spill-overs or civil wars ravaging the 
receiving country threaten in particular refu-
gee camps and villages where DPs seek refuge. 
Instead of protection, DPs witness or become 
victims of random killings, rapes and torture, 
the burning and looting of villages and camps, 
and forcible recruitment of minors and youth.
   \  Armed groups or state forces often coerce DPs 
to relocate to the country or area of origin 
where armed fighting continues, and land 
mines and unexploded ordnances have not 
been removed. DPs also return into dangerous 
conditions due to a lack of alternatives, either 
without assistance or because supported 
return and attempts to push people to return 
begin prematurely. 
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Access to food, land and housing:  
Key insights
   \  Lack of sufficient food, drinking water or shelter 
is not limited to the ‘emergency phase’ after 
expulsion but may re-occur at any point during 
protracted displacement, be a continuous  
feature thereof or become worse over time. The 
main reason is that the regions where people 
are displaced to and (temporarily) return to 
(the receiving areas) are sites where people are 
already struggling with little food, water and 
(access to) fertile land. Insufficient or even 
non-existent aid to cover basic needs, and  
governments that deliberately cut down DPs’ 
livelihood options through legal and political 
constraints, contribute to their plight. Finally, 
tensions between DPs and local residents—often 
due to (perceived or real) inequalities in aid 
distribution—, reoccurring and shifting  
violence as well as slow recovery from the  
destruction caused by armed fighting are creat-
ing unsafety, food and water scarcity and a lack 
of shelter. 
   \  Access to land is a particularly contested and 
conflictive issue during protracted displace-
ment as well as upon return. During DPs’ long-
term absence, others frequently claim and take 
control over their land; sometimes armed groups, 
local power holders or investors appropriate it 
during or after armed conflicts. Hybrid and 
overlapping systems of land tenure and land 
governance or (selective) non-enforcement of 
legal regulations by governments complicate 
re-accessing the land. This results in limited or 
no access for DPs, returnees and marginalised 
groups of local residents to their former place 
of settlement and could, potentially, spark new 
conflicts. 
   \  The lack of access to land and housing forces 
DPs to settle in areas where income-generation 
opportunities are lowest or where organised 
crime prevails. Areas prone to natural disasters 
(drought, flooding or landslides) and areas 
where DPs compete with local marginalised 
groups put them at constant risk of eviction. 
The lack of tenure security significantly in-
creases DPs’ vulnerability and reduces their 
chances of self-reliance.
   \  Most DPs, returnees and marginalised local 
residents suffering from a lack of or highly  
volatile access to basic livelihood-sustaining 
resources also suffer from social and political 
exclusion and tend to be cut-off from interna-
tional assistance. Different dimensions of 
(non-)access are entangled with each other 
and add up to multiple exclusions. These find-
ings confirm that the deprivation from one  
asset must never be seen in isolation from  
other deprivations, as has been conceived in 
the notion of access as a ‘bundle of powers’. 
Recommendations for action
   \  Be attentive to displacement-related ‘invisible emer-
gencies’ and provide adequate support. For many, 
protracted displacement means life in extreme 
poverty or permanent emergency-like condi-
tions. The need for assistance during protracted 
displacement and upon return may be as urgent 
as in newly occurring displacements, even 
though people’s distress may be less obvious. 
   \  Consider the needs of the local inhabitants and the 
DPs, assist them equally and be transparent about 
who receives what. Unfulfilled expectations of 
local residents and perceived or real inequali-
ties in aid distribution can create tensions  
between them and the DPs resulting in reduced 
livelihood options for the DPs.
   \  Encourage and support government initiatives im-
proving access to land for DPs and returnees. Such 
initiatives can contribute significantly to con-
flict prevention and self-sufficiency if they are 
based on adequate participation of the stake-
holders (landowners, DPs/returnees) and clearly 
determine rights and responsibilities of all  
parties involved, especially in the long-run. 
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   \  Measure successful (re)integration in the light of  
human, economic, social and cultural rights. As  
displacement and return tend to take place in 
impoverished and marginalised areas, compar-
isons between the standard of living of DPs/ 
returnees and local residents are inappropriate 
to measure the success of (re)integration.  
Consequences of inadequate assessments of 
(re)integration can be insufficient assistance, 
tensions, violence and renewed displacements.
Access to basic services—Health care 
and education: Key insights
   \  Armed conflict and protracted displacement 
both increase the need for medical assistance 
and good quality and accessible health care. 
Many DPs, having experienced traumata or 
suffering from depression or severe physical 
injuries also need psychological support and 
trauma healing. DPs’ access to health care 
tends to be restricted, however, either due to 
the general unavailability of health services in 
areas affected by armed conflict or due to high 
costs, which DPs in need cannot afford. Undoc-
umented persons are the most at risk as they 
usually have no legal access to health care. 
Among this group, untreated diseases inevitably 
lead to worsening health conditions, a multi-
plication of health-related problems and higher 
mortality.
   \  For DPs, access to education is linked with the 
hope that at least the next generation will be 
able to overcome the conditions of protracted 
displacement. Often, however, high fees, the 
lack of documents required for enrolment and 
language barriers restrict access to education 
for DPs, especially if they also lack access to  
income. Further restrictions occur due to a 
general lack of schools and teachers in receiv-
ing areas and, in particular for girls, lacking 
safe transportation to and from schools as well 
as a lack of sanitation in schools. Early and 
child marriage as a means to cope with im-
poverishment or the need to send children to 
work are additional obstacles. Discrimination 
and low quality of teaching further lower the 
chances of displaced students to benefit from 
education.
   \  When displaced persons have access to edu-
cation, degrees are often not transferable or 
recognised in public, private and even self- 
organised education. Vocational training  
offered by international organisations often 
disregards local labour market needs as well 
as people’s preferences and capacities.
   \  The lack of access to education and health 
care undermines people’s chances to over-
come conditions of protracted displacement, 
possibly for several generations. The research 
revealed how different dimensions of exclu-
sion interact with and induce each other. 
Lack of access to health care, apart from cre-
ating a multiplicity of problems in the longer 
term, is a reason why people are unable to 
take up jobs or employment, and the lack of 
income forces parents to keep the children 
out of schools. This combination of factors 
prolongs protracted displacement as it pre-
vents (re)integration. 
Recommendations for action
   \  Assess the health needs of people in protracted  
displacement and provide the necessary treatment. 
This must be a priority in any intervention 
aiming to end protracted displacement.  
Lacking access to health care may be an  
underlying obstacle for people’s ability to 
(re)integrate, for example, into the labour 
market. 
   \  Establish lasting and inclusive health care structures. 
When supporting the establishment of health 
care services, agencies should make sure that 
these services are accessible across the coun-
try to everyone in need—displaced persons/
returnees and locals alike. Funding has to be 
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   \  Lack of income is one of the main reasons for 
onward and circular mobility of DPs and fami-
lies (or individuals on behalf of their families). 
In other cases, lack of income forces families to 
send their children to work, and in some cases, 
it drives young men to join armed groups.
   \  Highly-skilled DPs rarely get the chance to use 
their qualifications after displacement, due to a 
lack of (legal) opportunities, language barriers, 
lack of (recognition of) certificates, discrimina-
tion, or laws confining non-citizens to low-
skilled sectors. Owing to good personal net-
works or a reputation for being highly skilled, 
some DPs have succeeded in getting jobs that 
match their qualifications.
   \  In the large informal economies of many middle- 
income countries that receive refugees, em-
ployers benefit from the surplus of labour 
through displacement. This allows them to pay 
lower wages and bypass workers’ rights and 
regulations, often with adverse effects on the 
local workforce, depending on the degree of 
stratification of the labour market. The reduc-
tion of wages and salaries also affects previous 
generations of labour migrants and DPs who 
may be replaced by these newcomers—who,  
in turn, may be rejected by former jobholders. 
Although DPs may find relatively flexible op-
portunities to earn some money in the informal 
economy, these are often associated with having 
to accept challenging and sometimes danger-
ous working conditions, no labour rights, low 
income, no planning security, etc.. While formal 
employment offers some protection against 
exploitation, the conditions often do not differ 
much from those in the informal economy.
   \  Under such conditions, DPs’ attempts to become 
self-reliant by earning an income do not go 
along with actual integration. In the common 
context of legal uncertainty, DPs are often only 
taken on under the condition that they accept 
a treatment that differs from that of local 
workers. Many fill certain niches at the lower 
end of income scales at the margin of the  
sufficient to ensure the running of health facil-
ities in the long term and, wherever possible, 
originate from domestic sources. The fact that 
some people, especially returnees who were 
injured during the war, may never fully recover 
and thus need life-long support and assistance, 
needs to be accounted for.
   \  Ensure displaced children’s access to their right to 
education. Making education accessible for 
long-term displaced persons requires affordable 
and inclusive primary, secondary and tertiary 
education services. Education services must 
comply with clear and (at least regionally, bet-
ter internationally) recognised standards and 
safeguard the option of linking up with further 
educational opportunities (vocational and pro-
fessional training, higher education, etc.). This 
must include the transferability of degrees and 
certificates between countries to facilitate, e.g., 
the return of DPs. 
   \  Provide vocational training according to regular  
assessments of (regional) labour market needs.  
Vocational training needs to draw on an assess-
ment of labour market needs, also when pre-
paring people for return, as well as of people’s 
skills, capacities and preferences. 
Access to income by employment:  
Key insights
   \  Access to income-generating activities for dis-
placed persons are blocked by (a) a lack of em-
ployment opportunities, often combined with 
clientelist structures in least developed and 
war-affected (including so-called post-conflict) 
countries and (b) legal and political measures 
to protect the domestic labour market. More 
general exclusion occurs due to bans for DPs 
from opening bank accounts, buying SIM cards, 
owning or renting property, registering busi-
nesses, etc. in middle-income countries. These 
conditions make working in the informal  
sector the most attractive or the only option for 
people in protracted displacement.
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   \  Keep viable options for DPs’ income-generation in 
the informal economy open as long as no alternative 
income sources are available. The informal labour 
markets have to be seen for what they are: 
They provide opportunities for de facto (re)in-
tegration and chances to sustain a livelihood, 
however marginal, in contexts where alterna-
tives are rare or non-existent. Therefore, pro-
grammes attempting to increase employment 
opportunities for DPs need to make sure to not 
close down these options including, for example, 
unregistered home-run businesses by women, 
before viable alternatives have been created for 
all people concerned.
receiving societies who often look down upon 
them as a result. Hence, informal employment 
allows people to survive but prevents social  
upward mobility and limits opportunities to 
interact with and become a part of the local  
social context. These social effects occur even 
though entire industries may depend on the 
cheap labour of DPs. 
Recommendations for action
   \  Focus on the establishment of value- and production 
chains grounded on local resources and products. 
Where a formal economy is yet to develop,  
locally-based value- and production chains, for 
example, by processing and conserving agri-
cultural products, can provide people with 
much-needed work and a long-term 
perspective.
   \  Assess DPs’ qualifications and support the opening 
of entrance possibilities in the formal labour market. 
DPs have all kinds of skills and qualifications. 
To increase the benefits they can bring to the 
local economies in receiving areas, avenues  
to identify and use their qualifications in the  
formal labour market should be explored and 
supported.
   \  Assistance for DPs requires a careful and realistic ap-
praisal of its repercussions for the local labour supply, 
labour rights and wage scales. Contexts with high 
numbers of DPs often experience a ‘race to the 
bottom’ regarding labour rights, standards and 
wages. While DPs who receive assistance may 
be in a position to live off lower than average 
salaries, their competition affects local workers, 
(undocumented) migrants and other groups 
that are not beneficiaries of assistance. The  
potential of this unequal competition to create 
tensions and even worsen conditions for every-
one once assistance runs out is high. When  
external support is given to DPs to integrate into 
the labour market, standards should remain at 
the same level to avoid long-term harm.
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The chapter also highlights the implications aris-
ing from these four aspects for a DPs’ livelihood. It 
thus covers the impoverishment risks of being “out-
lawed” in the sense of having no access to opportuni-
ties to claim rights, being politically voiceless, being 
without valid documents and being unaware of one’s 
rights (risks k–n from Box 1 - p. 14). 
This chapter presents the research results 
regarding
   \  DPs’ awareness of and opportunities to claim 
rights, 
   \  political framework conditions, 
   \  DPs’ access to and significance of legal docu-
ments, and 
   \  implications of being undocumented and 
forced returns. 
Empirical findings: Livelihood and legality
Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
Economic migration and displacement from Syria 
Aziz*, 45 years old,  
worker, refugee camp Qusthapa, south of Erbil
Aziz lives with his wife and children in one of the 
houses built by the United Arab Emirates in the camp. 
“Our house consists of a small courtyard that is used 
as a kitchen, a terrace and storage facility, a living 
room and a bedroom. It has water, electricity and a 
toilet. The camp is entirely made up of Syrian Kurdish 
refugees”, Aziz explains. It is rather crowded but of-
fers all amenities typical to such camps: Training and 
meeting facilities for the women and elders, sports 
grounds for youth, some shacks turned into shops 
and restaurants, child-friendly spaces, NGO and camp 
management offices. It is situated less than an hour’s 
drive from Erbil, Iraq-Kurdistan. “Many of us had 
found work in nearby factories upon arrival, but most 
have lost them again”, Aziz describes the situation. 
Many of the workers complain about low salaries, and 
especially the women report harassment in the work-
place. 
Aziz used to be an electrician fixing meters in the 
Kurdish part of Syria. As a Kurd, he had problems with 
being recognized as a full citizen of Syria. He recounts: 
“I was neither allowed to own land nor buy a house 
or a shop. I was harassed and threatened repeatedly 
by the Syrian regime for being active in Kurdish cul-
tural activities such as theatre and dancing groups”. 
Though he had obtained a degree, he explains: “I did 
not get permanent employment and had to live on 
day jobs”. Without the necessary documentation  
he was neither offered proper employment nor  
was he allowed to buy a shop, so he rented a work-
shop to get along. “When the economic situation  
in Syria got unbearable I went to Iraq to find a job 
there to come back and pay the workshop’s rent”.  
He indeed found a job and was hired in Slemani. His 
family stayed behind in the Syrian war. “An explosion 
hit the neighbourhood of my family’s home in  
Syria. My wife and the children fled to Iraq”. Finally, 
they ended up in a refugee camp close to Erbil. 
Even though his boss offered to raise his salary  
significantly, Aziz decided to move into the refugee 
camp with his family and to become a registered  
refugee himself. He asserted: “Before my family came, 
I was not a refugee”. Instead, he considers himself a 
worker. Despite experiencing human rights viola-
tions, threats, and war discrimination, despite leaving 
his family behind in a war zone, he does not consider 
these issues but economic reasons to be the cause of 
his migration. 
It is 2018; Aziz and his family are still living in the 
camp. He has managed to get a position in a Kurdish 
TV station. One of his daughters won a scholarship  
by an international organization and is about to  
start studying abroad. 
* name changed
Aleppo
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IRAN
SAUDI ARABIA
Iraqi Kurdistan
Area controlled by SDF (Nov. 2018)
SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces): 
Alliance of predominantly Kurdish militias.
Syria and region Kurdistan-Iraq
Sources: Natural Earth Data 2018, liveuamap.com 2018.  Map layout: Hannes Blitza, November 2018
Boys in a refugee camp near Erbil, Iraq-Kurdistan. BICC \ M. Rudolf
©BICC
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Awareness of and opportunities to 
claim rights: Key insights
   \  De facto opportunities for people in protracted 
displacement and returnees to claim their 
rights may differ largely from the rights guar-
anteed to them on paper. The reasons are that 
states’ executive and judicial institutions are 
often weak in contexts of protracted armed 
conflicts, and social and political orders are  
violently contested. 
   \  DPs do not even try to claim their rights for 
these most commonly mentioned reasons: 
(a) fear from and concrete threats of violence 
and revenge, linked with a climate of impunity 
for perpetrators and (b) lack of trust in the  
police and judiciary due to widespread corrup-
tion, clientelism and discrimination.  
   \  Access to justice is distributed very unequally. 
Factors impeding justice for DPs and receiving 
community members are socio-economic  
marginalisation, living in areas controlled by 
or contested between non-state armed groups, 
or having the ‘wrong’ ethnic background, espe-
cially during and after ethnically charged con-
flict. The loss of a protective extended family or 
patron–client relations can also lead to a lack of 
rights to protection and their enforcement.
   \  The exclusion from opportunities to claim 
one’s rights makes DPs vulnerable to extortion 
by various groups, including public authorities 
and police. Therefore, poor families in protracted 
displacement are forced to invest a significant 
share of their meagre income in bribes, and DP 
entrepreneurs cannot enforce payments of 
bills for products or services delivered. More 
generally, DPs cannot legally defend themselves 
against violence, harassment, dispossession, etc.
Recommendations for action
   \  Projects involving people in protracted displacement 
need to be based on a context analysis detailing de 
facto opportunities for different groups of people to 
claim their rights and get access to justice. The lack 
As the previous chapter has shown, being excluded 
from livelihood-sustaining resources and services 
often goes along with or is even enforced by the fact 
that there is neither political nor legal representation 
of affected groups. The respective legal and political 
framework can open up opportunities for access to 
work, services or legal status for example, or—by  
denying them—create vulnerabilities. Our findings 
also indicate, however, that the circumstances that 
influence legality, for example access to a legal status, 
and that shape livelihood options are highly context- 
dependent. There are significant differences as to 
how legal regulations are translated into practice.  
Local social norms, embedded in power hierarchies 
and shaped by intergroup relations and -perceptions 
interact with and sometimes contradict legal frame-
works, thus mediating their effects and creating a 
network of obstacles and opportunities that dis-
placed people navigate according to their under-
standing of it. In this understanding, political and 
state institutions, including those of the executive  
or judiciary, may be extensions of such more locally 
embedded social norms and power hierarchies and 
do not necessarily see their task in applying the legal 
framework, thus creating gaps between de facto and 
de jure access to rights. Different levels of inclusion, 
exclusion and (partial) belonging, and with those a 
stratification of access to rights, does not only affect 
displaced persons but often also applies to other  
social groups including recent and long-settled  
immigrants, ethnic minorities, nomads, etc. (Rudolf, 
forthcoming a) and often interrelates with socio-eco-
nomic status or class dispositions (Grawert & Mielke, 
2018). The story of Aziz (p. 25)  illustrates this situation.
External factors, geopolitical considerations or 
changing refugee regimes in other areas can greatly 
influence the political climate in a given country. 
Thus the influence of the political context is not to be 
underestimated; however, the findings indicate that 
DPs pursue pathways for (re)integration regardless of 
the limitations by immigration and refugee policies 
in the respective destination countries. This implies 
that these policies frame, but not determine, the  
endeavours of DPs.
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to secure their livelihood. Examples for factors 
that strongly impact on DPs are the type, out-
reach and stability of the government, economic 
crises, security threats, international geopoliti-
cal considerations with subsequent changes in 
alliances, strategies or power relations, and 
even personal career ambitions of politicians.
   \  An adverse political climate makes (re)integra-
tion attempts extremely difficult and can un-
dermine any chance of pursuing a livelihood 
legally. Favourable political and legal frame-
work conditions tend to be ideologically based 
and can, but do not necessarily translate into 
tangible improvements for DPs on the ground.
Recommendations for action
   \  Offer initial and temporary support for interest- 
based grassroots organisations whose members are a 
mix of DPs and the receiving community. Mixed 
organisations can facilitate the mutual under-
standing of DPs and local community members 
and the recognition of similarities in deprivation 
and exclusion. Such local organisations can 
represent the common interests of DPs and 
groups from the receiving communities towards 
local councils, other institutions and aid agen-
cies. The joint activities can facilitate (re)inte-
gration in the long run.
   \  Encourage participation in planning and implement-
ing humanitarian and development projects in con-
texts of (re)integration. Development cooperation 
can benefit greatly from allowing beneficiaries 
and target groups to genuinely participate in 
such projects. This will, at the same time, con-
tribute to giving them a voice on matters that 
concern them (see also BICC Policy Brief 9/19 for 
more details on this).
   \  Increase community awareness about the situation 
of DPs living among them. Development coopera-
tion can and has contributed—by education 
guidelines, information campaigns and ex-
change programmes—to reducing stereotypes 
and misinformation about DPs. These meas-
ures can also prevent the politicisation of DPs’ 
situation.
of the rule of law and predatory behaviour of 
officers of the judiciary and government im-
pinge on the longer-term livelihood options of 
DPs and hence, impede (re)integration. Moreo-
ver, these conditions can limit possible positive 
effects of any project supporting the in-
come-generation for DPs by simply diverting 
the money put into it or by taking it from the 
intended beneficiaries.
   \  Support the establishment of accountable public in-
stitutions and the rule of law after armed conflicts in 
the long run. To eradicate the adverse impact of 
large-scale corruption that prevents DPs from 
gaining access to rights and justice, a high  
degree of donor coordination, alignment with 
state actors and long-term commitment after 
the end of a war is required. Such measures 
need to be repeatedly evaluated against the  
de facto performance of the judiciary.
Political framework conditions:  
Key insights
   \  DPs are mostly cut-off from opportunities of 
political participation and representation, both 
inside and outside their countries of citizenship. 
They have hardly any influence on political 
decision-making regarding their situation and 
political responsiveness towards their living 
conditions and needs. Partial or non-imple-
mentation of internationally endorsed refugee 
and human rights instruments is common.
   \  Living in territories controlled by non-state 
armed groups is often worse in terms of access 
to services and rights for DPs than living in 
state-controlled areas.
   \  As a result of their politically marginalised  
position, DPs can easily become politically in-
strumentalised. Moreover, the political climate 
can change significantly over time, affecting 
DPs adversely or positively. Sometimes, the  
political climate responds to global trends in 
refugee protection, for example, changing 
practices of burden–sharing and –shifting 
among states. Often, domestic factors are cru-
cial for the conditions under which DPs have 
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Recommendations for action
   \  Humanitarian and development assistance should 
not be tied to a certain legal status but be indiscrimi-
nately provided for people in need. Humanitarian 
and development agencies must recognise that 
the legal status of a person reflects the (chang-
ing) legal and political opportunities and con-
straints at the current place of residence rather 
than the initial cause of displacement. The  
allocation of a legal status as a refugee takes 
place ex-post—that is, (sometimes long) after 
displacement—and does not equally include 
persons with the same need for assistance.  
DPs who lost their documents or cannot pay 
smugglers are, therefore, treated differently 
even though they may have experienced the 
same hardship of displacement as those who 
received a legal status.
   \  Facilitate access to legal documents for undocumented 
DPs. Valid documents provide at least a certain 
minimum of security and facilitate access to basic 
services. Therefore, initiatives to reduce the 
number of undocumented persons through 
amnesties and a reduction of costs and bureau-
cratic obstacles to obtaining papers should be 
supported. 
Implications of being undocumented 
and forced return: Key insights
   \  For various reasons which are beyond their 
control, many DPs, including IDPs, are excluded 
from accessing a legal status. Some DPs delib-
erately avoid the exclusions and restrictions 
that come with having a legal status (e.g. a ref-
ugee status). Wherever there are registered DPs, 
there are also unregistered ones.
   \  Living without valid documents often means 
living in hiding and avoiding public services 
for fear of being identified. Undocumented DPs 
   \  Fulfil promises about fairer burden- and  
responsibility sharing between countries. The Global 
Refugee Compact needs to be filled with life 
and followed up by action. The Global North 
needs to revitalise its solidarity with those flee-
ing from war and persecution, otherwise a race 
to the bottom regarding protection standards 
is inevitable. 
Access to and meanings of legal  
documents: Key insights
   \  Access to valid documents can safeguard 
achieved levels of de facto (re)integration and 
unlock further livelihood opportunities.
   \  Many DPs, however, including IDPs and return-
ees, do not manage to obtain proof of a valid  
legal status (refugee or citizen). This is either 
because political decisions or conflict dynam-
ics block their access to legal documents or due 
to high costs, bureaucratic obstacles and miss-
ing documents like birth certificates or ID 
cards required to obtain legal status.
   \  The legal status is more reflective of the  
options provided to the DPs by the political 
framework conditions than of the initial causes 
of displacement. Chances of obtaining and 
keeping a legal status are also higher when the 
DP has a high socioeconomic status or good 
personal networks, indicating considerable 
inequality among DPs.
   \  There are contexts where even having a docu-
mented legal status has little or no value, mostly 
when the political and public climate has 
turned against (certain groups of) DPs.
   \  In some places, so many constraints are  
attached to a refugee status (e.g. no freedom of 
movement, no permission to work) that people 
may choose not to apply for it to maintain a 
minimum of control over their livelihood.
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face the permanent risk and fear of imprison-
ment or deportation and hence have no or 
hardly any prospect of a formalisation of 
achieved levels of (re)integration. They tend to 
remain subjected to exploitation, extortion and 
violent behaviour as they lack access to legal 
remedies.
   \  After deportation, DPs struggle the most. They 
had no time to prepare their return and have 
lost their previous livelihood. In many cases, 
they also struggle with social stigmatisation, 
which further inhibits reintegration.
Recommendations for action
   \  Include undocumented persons in needs and vulnera-
bility assessments and avoid shutting down of their 
livelihood options. Undocumented persons are 
likely to pursue different and less visible liveli-
hood strategies than documented ones. As part 
of do-no-harm, any measure that undermines 
undocumented people’s livelihood should be 
avoided unless a viable alternative is found, as 
they often have very few options. Therefore, 
needs and vulnerability assessments should 
ideally also include undocumented persons, 
even though they may be hard to reach out to.
   \  Assist deported DPs to rebuild their lives in the long 
term and enable them to reintegrate. After having 
been forced to return, people struggle the most 
to settle and secure their livelihood. Deporta-
tions, especially into countries at war, should 
therefore not be supported. However, coerced 
relocations do take place, and those deported 
usually need substantial and long-term assis-
tance to rebuild their lives.
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In an attempt to deal with the various exclusions, 
constraints and uncertainties they face, DPs adopt 
diverse strategies to retain or regain sources of liveli-
hood (see Box below). Having focussed on agency and 
livelihood-making, the research uncovered a diversity 
of different coping strategies and ways of dealing 
with the impacts of protracted displacement, which 
go beyond the dimensions of access and exclusion 
listed in the IRR. The most important strategies, (a) 
(im)mobility between protracted conflicts and liveli-
hoods opportunities, (b) trans-local networks, (c)  
returning or staying, and (d) self-organisation and 
adaptation are presented in this chapter. Spatial 
mobility has emerged not only as a constant feature 
of protracted internal displacement for people who 
need to avoid the shifting hotspots of violence but 
also as an expression of DPs’ permanent search for 
livelihood opportunities in exile. The importance of 
spatial mobility for DPs, which has so far not received 
much attention in research on protracted displace-
ment, is highlighted by the plight of DPs or displaced-
in-place, who are cut off from this option (forced im-
mobility). A result of spatial mobility on the one hand 
and facilitating condition thereof on the other are 
trans-local networks of DPs, which also support DPs’ 
resilience and livelihood-making in other ways. 
Empirical findings: 
Livelihood and coping strategies of displaced persons
Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
Local integration in Tanzania 
Mathias*, 66 years old,  
mechanic, driver, trader, in the settlement Katumba, region Katavi
“I was 18 when I fled from Burundi in 1972. I saw  
people die, so I ran away”. Mathias explains: “It was 
the army. They shot into the crowd without making 
any difference. I only saved my life. I was lucky and 
fled with my parents. Seven brothers and three  
sisters were murdered. We got on the boat to cross 
lake Tangayika. We had to pay a lot of money for that 
to Kigoma in Tanzania”. From there, he and his par-
ents were directly transported to the refugee  
settlement Katumba where they were registered and 
received tents, blankets and food. Later, they were 
given 70 x 100m of land and some tools. Mathias  
and his family had to clear the land: “We built  
bamboo huts and then houses. We couldn’t just  
leave the camp, we needed a permit for that”. 
The situation in the camp was difficult, but Mathias 
found another option. Since he had been working as a 
mechanic before he was displaced, he was employed 
by an NGO. He became a driver and worked for many 
years in Kasulu and Kigoma. Three of his children 
were born there. Today, they are studying in Kigoma, 
two are married—and citizens of Tanzania. Mathias 
himself, however, has no citizenship: “When you could 
register in the camps, I was in the city. That’s why I 
missed it”.
As it had become more difficult to make a living in 
Kigoma, Mathias decided to return to the settlement. 
Katumbo is located in one of the poorer and less  
populated areas of eastern Tanzania. Some of the  
settlements of the Burundian refugees are very  
isolated, but Katumbo is easy to reach from the dis-
trict capital. 
“Here, life is cheaper. I have land, six fields and grow 
peanuts, corn and sunflowers. In 2014, I built a house.  
I can do small business”. Mathias runs a restaurant,  
a teashop and sells small amounts of gasoline.  
He would like to have documents because those  
who have a citizenship have less problems: “All the  
others can’t move freely”. Nevertheless, he does  
not think of returning to Burundi: “In the last  
46 years, things have changed—my parents and  
myself included”.
* name changed
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Mobility and trans-local networks are expressions of 
DPs agency as well as the structural constraints they 
are constantly confronted with, as neither mobility 
nor networks necessarily translate into opportunities 
for development and social upward mobility (Grawert 
& Mielke, 2018, pp. 10-11). The fact that displaced people 
have to strongly rely on those highlights the condi-
tions of rejection by one or several states and societies 
that they are facing.
(Im)mobility between protracted  
conflict and livelihood opportunities: 
Key insights
   \  In contexts of violent conflicts, the decision  
to flee is a result of a combination of several 
factors and is often taken in several steps. Most 
people leave their house and property when  
violence and immediate threats start to affect 
them directly, hoping to be able to return soon. 
They will decide to leave the country (for those 
who can) when they do not expect any chance 
to retain livelihood options in their country of 
origin and have lost the hope that conditions 
will improve. The decision to flee across their 
country’s border can also be linked to the exist-
ence of family networks abroad. 
   \  IDPs often embark on journeys that may take 
years, guided by attempts to avoid armed 
groups and hot-spots of violence in search for 
shelter. They usually try to stay in contact with 
family members while searching for sources  
of livelihood in different places, often without 
being able to settle anywhere permanently. But 
even those DPs who no longer live under con-
ditions of armed conflict often keep moving in 
the attempt to reunite with their families or 
because they cannot find a place which allows 
them to live in safety and to make a living at 
the same time.
   \  Despite a strong inclination to stay together as 
families, DPs are often forced to split up at dif-
ferent points along the way, e.g. due to security 
considerations. Many adopt poly-local house-
holds as a strategy to diversify their livelihood 
sources. For example, they would leave one fam-
ily member behind to farm the land and main-
tain chances for return, or they would leave 
women and children in safer areas while the 
men, including minors, move around in search 
of jobs and income.
   \  The ability to be mobile is not distributed equally. 
Some people lack the means to flee far enough 
to get themselves out of harm’s way. In some 
cases, armed groups force people to stay. Some 
people decide to stay against all odds hoping 
that they can maintain access to their assets 
like land by their presence.
   \  Where spatial mobility has become a livelihood 
strategy for DPs, this is usually due to a lack of 
alternatives or is regarded as necessary to live a 
life in dignity (one example is when DPs move 
out of camps that do not offer privacy or protec-
tion against sexual harassment). If legal, mobil-
ity-related livelihood options are closed, the  
result tends to be (a) the formation of an illicit 
economy that offers those who can afford it a 
way around those restrictions, and (b) being 
stuck in a vicious cycle of insecurity, impover-
ishment and indebtedness for those who cannot 
afford (illicit) mobility. 
Recommendations for action
   \  Spatial mobility must be acknowledged as a central 
strategy for DPs who aim to re-gain self-reliance  
and should, therefore, not be constrained. Onward 
mobility of DPs, rather than regarding it as a 
problem or ignoring it altogether, needs to be  
understood as an important coping strategy and 
attempt by DPs to increase their self-reliance. 
Aid and assistance, when offered, should thus 
not undermine DPs’ chances for mobility (not 
be bound to registration in one place, for 
instance).
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   \  Open up income opportunities for DPs to avoid the 
trap of indebtedness and aid dependence. Mobility 
practices including those taking place infor-
mally, semi- or ‘illegally’, result from a lack of 
alternatives. Restricting these practices without 
improving the economic framework conditions 
and providing chances for DPs to access social 
services will cut them off from essential means 
to sustain themselves where they are. The  
result will be that entire families are stuck in 
vicious cycles of indebtedness and lack any  
future perspective.
   \  Widen the mobility options for DPs by offering  
exchange and scholarship programmes, facilitating 
access to work visa, etc. Spatial mobility of DPs 
can be a successful livelihood strategy. Offers 
that provide opportunities for DPs to attain a 
higher qualification or remain independent 
from assistance through access to employment 
abroad can improve their chances to benefit 
from spatial mobility. 
Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
Dispersed families and ruptured livelihood
Maribel*, 23 years old,  
unemployed, Ecuador
Maribel lived in a small village within an indigenous 
reservation in Nariño, Colombia, until the age of 12. 
“My family had a finca there. We had animals and 
cultivated crops, vegetables and fruits”, Maribel re-
members. The camp of the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia) was very close to their 
village. “In 2006, when the Colombian Army bombed 
the FARC camp, we fled to a nearby town in Nariño. 
There, fighting continued”, she explains. Maribel  
became an eyewitness of massacres against the  
population. Nevertheless, she succeeded in finishing 
high school at the age of 16 and went to a technical 
school until she was 18. 
When the killing continued, her aunt who lived in 
an Ecuadorian village close to the Colombian border 
called her and asked her to come to Ecuador. She and 
her husband went to Ecuador via Rumichaca in May 
2017. “For the first weeks, we stayed with my aunt. 
Now we have rented a room in the house of  another 
aunt. My husband works as a day worker picking 
fruits in the nearby fincas. He earns around US $12 per 
day—enough to buy food”, Maribel explains her  
situation. 
“In the beginning, we thought that we would return 
soon, but the killing of one of my half-brothers in  
August 2017 finally made us change our minds”. As 
Maribel had planned to return soon, she never applied 
for asylum nor for a migrant status and has no papers  
besides her Colombian identification card. Having 
heard that the new Ecuadorian law on human mobility 
will introduce fines for those without papers, she  
is thinking about applying for documents. 
“My family is split up: My great-aunt, my aunt,  
my cousins, my husband and I are in Ecuador, my  
mother and one of my brothers remain in Nariño.  
Another other brother has been internally displaced  
to Cali. My grandfather who used to live in Ecuador  
has recently returned to his home village”, Maribel  
describes her situation. She is reluctant to talk about  
her opinion on the peace process as many other  
Colombians close to the border and to their former  
perpetrators are.
“It is impossible to find a job here since the landlords 
of the fincas only employ men. To find another job, 
one would have to move to the city and to have  
proper papers”, Maribel says. 
* name changed
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from one family member, who lives abroad and 
has an income. Once this person loses their  
income or is forced to return to their country  
of origin, all relatives may have to move into a 
camp or simply face reduced chances of access 
to services like education, etc.
To return or not to return? Key insights
   \  Regardless of large-scale repatriation pro-
grammes, the majority of returns are self- 
organised. DPs actively search for information 
about the conditions in their places of origin.  
If allowed, they will make their own decision 
whether, when and where to return to, based on 
criteria by which they compare the potential 
places of residence in exile and upon return.  
In many cases, however, even self-organised  
returns are the result of a lack of alternatives.
   \  The main criteria for return are the prospects 
for physical safety (which may vary from  
person to person, e.g. based on their ethnic 
background, gender or political activities) and 
livelihood opportunities (availability of infra-
structure, public services, access to land and 
legal documents). The presence and well-being 
of (extended) family members and the DPs’  
capacity to start and build up a new life upon 
return are crucial criteria, too. 
   \  Peace agreements and elections can trigger  
return movements or increase the pressure to 
return but often mislead people about de facto 
prospects for peace and stability on the ground.
   \  The time spent in exile is an important variable 
for the readiness to return. Having established 
a feeling of belonging in the country of resi-
dence and having invested a lot into building  
a livelihood there, as well as giving children 
the chance to finish their education and the 
perceived need to save and prepare for a new 
beginning after return are reasons against or 
for a later return. The longer people have stayed 
in exile, the less probable they are to return,  
especially when children have been born and 
raised, visited schools or found work in exile.
Trans-local networks: Key insights
   \  Trans-local networks emerge when DPs  
connect with earlier generations of DPs or  
migrants, often from the same extended family 
who live in other places within the same coun-
try or abroad. These networks are, to varying 
degrees, manifestations of a trans-local mode 
of living that people adopt when searching for 
safety and livelihood opportunities. DPs who 
live trans-locally simultaneously belong to 
groups in different places.
   \  Strong trans-local networks form a crucial 
source of livelihood as they enable members  
to access remittances, facilitate mobility and 
migration and provide a chance to escape from 
violent conflicts. Members of the network can 
help displaced relatives by hosting them, pro-
viding contacts with smugglers and (tempo-
rary) funding. The network members can guide 
newcomers in ways to overcome bureaucratic 
hurdles, assist with their knowledge of the 
local labour market and contacts to help the 
newly displaced to find jobs or educational  
opportunities. In some cases, trans-local net-
works can offer business ties across borders.
   \  The strength and livelihood-generating effects 
of trans-local networks are an expression of a 
persons’ positionality in society. Hence, despite 
their supportive role, these networks may ex-
acerbate rather than overcome socio-economic 
differences between displaced persons.
Recommendations for action
   \  Facilitate money transfers within trans-local (family) 
networks at little cost. Money transfers to people 
in protracted displacement can play a signifi-
cant role in their resilience and offer chances 
to overcome conditions of protracted displace-
ment. Therefore, informal money transfers 
should not be closed down unless alternative 
ways have been established.
   \  Increase sustainable options for legal migration.  
The livelihood of entire families in protracted 
displacement often depends on remittances 
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   \  A strong wish to return is not limited to the  
period soon after displacement; it may last for 
decades but often reflects a longing to return 
to the lost pre-crisis home rather than return-
ing to the place of origin as it is.
   \  Moving back and forth between places of origin 
and residence or temporarily staying some-
where half-way in-between the place of origin 
and displacement is a common response to un-
safe or unsatisfactory conditions at both places. 
Circular movements can also be a deliberate 
strategy to connect the original with the new 
society and involve economic endeavours to 
bridge two (or more) countries.
Recommendations for action:
   \  Put efforts in the progress of peace negotiations and 
support repatriation only when the fighting has ended 
and armed groups have been demobilised and dis-
armed. Experiences with early repatriation that 
was reversed due to renewed armed fighting 
show that such measures can threaten the 
lives of returnees and create new large-scale 
displacement.
   \  Provide DPs with accurate information on their secu-
rity and livelihood options upon return, and leave the 
decision to them. Reintegration can only be 
achieved if DPs are well-prepared for return 
and have planning security in the mid-term. 
Pushing DPs into repatriation programmes by 
providing incentives hardly ever leads to dura-
ble reintegration. A volatile security situation, 
constraints of mobility within their country or 
limited trade opportunities prevent DPs from 
returning and hence, attempting to reintegrate.
   \  Facilitate the legal integration of DPs who are making 
a living on their own. Well-integrated DPs can 
overcome protracted displacement and its con-
straints if they and the following generations 
have the option to stay legally. Due to a feeling 
of belonging to their original and the current 
society, they may establish connections  
between the two places (through trade or  
business relations, etc.), from which all parties 
can benefit.
   \  Support reconstruction in a sustainable manner. The 
reason for most DPs to not return (if given a choice) 
is a lack of adequate framework conditions for reinte-
gration. Therefore, rather than investing in 
individual, short-term reintegration incentives, 
the reconstruction process in the country of 
origin, including marginalised and rural areas, 
should be supported. This needs to be done 
with an eye on the sustainability of such  
efforts, as new displacements by large-scale  
infrastructure projects or high resource needs 
must be avoided.
Self-organisation and adaptation: 
Key insights 
   \  In several instances, DPs have managed to close 
the gaps in their access to services by estab-
lishing schools, hospitals or health care centres 
by themselves or in cooperation with NGOs.
   \  Essential support, such as individually targeted 
medical or financial assistance, also comes 
from self-organised, often highly flexible and 
unbureaucratic networks of activists from the 
receiving society or is provided by immigrants 
from the same country as the displaced, who 
are willing to accept high personal risks, for 
example when channelling support to undocu-
mented DPs.
   \  To avoid discrimination and negative stereo-
typing, some displaced persons adopt strategies 
with which they change their appearance or 
accent to blend in or to be seen as someone  
entirely different.
   \  DPs’ self-organisation covers a broad range of 
aspects including mediation of conflicts, for  
instance in camps and mutual support and  
solidarity. Specific political self-organisation 
often focuses on refugee issues and can take 
the character of a diaspora organisation main-
taining contact with those who stay in the 
country of origin. Especially politically perse-
cuted minorities form strong representations 
in exile, which may take over the role of repre-
senting the interests of DPs in camps and 
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   \  Acknowledge DPs’ organisations and involve them 
in decision-making on issues affecting them while 
avoiding an exclusion of others. When DPs form 
their own organisations, these can become a 
valuable link between the DPs and humanitarian 
and development agencies as well as govern-
ment authorities. Concrete interventions and 
projects need to allow for the participation of 
various interest groups, including local residents 
and account for the diversity and potentially 
conflicting interests of the DPs, however (see 
below). 
liaising with humanitarian and development 
agencies, government authorities and security 
forces. 
Recommendations for action:
   \  Protect self-organised healthcare and education 
services and support them in achieving regional (or 
international) quality standards and having an open-
door policy for everyone. Through self-organised 
healthcare and education services, DPs gain 
the opportunity to get necessary treatment and 
education regardless of their legal status. 
Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
Persecuted minorities
Dislsoz*, 32 years old,  
English teacher from Bashiqua, Iraq
“We’re all going to Germany. Everyone will go. There 
is no future for Yazidis here, after everything that has 
happened to us. My husband is already there. He’s 
fine, but he misses the family,” explains Dislsoz. 
The young teacher comes from Bashiqua, a city near 
Mossul, Ninewa Province, Iraq. In the area around 
her hometown, different religious communities had 
lived side by side for thousands of years. When IS 
conquered Mossul, people were expelled, enslaved, 
or killed. “My husband was a Peshmerga and was 
wounded. His position was often bombed. Then I told 
him, either you stop or you go to Germany. We have 
already lost everything, our house, everything. I don’t 
want to lose you, too”. Her sister-in-law, a brother 
and an uncle are already there. 
In 2007, 24 Yazidis were killed in Mossul. After that,  
no Christians and Yazidis were allowed to study there. 
“I studied in Zakho (Iraqi Kurdistan) to become an 
English teacher. With the Kurdish degree it was easy 
to find a job in Dohuk when we fled from IS”. She had 
already tried to travel to Turkey in January 2017 with 
the two children of six and eight, already had a visa, 
but just as she was sitting on the bus they closed the 
border. In March, at her second attempt, she did not 
receive a salary payment and had to postpone the trip 
again. 
“Coming to Germany costs about US $4,000. The 
smugglers know how to make money. There were 
four buses full of Yazidis,” reports Dislsoz. Her  brother 
had made it all the way to Turkey. After fifteen days 
there, he even managed to reach Greece. “There, he 
was arrested and came back to Iraq after two days, 
but at least he didn’t have to pay the 4,000 dollars 
then”. 
My mother wants to stay in Iraq, but I just want to be 
reunited with my husband”. He has had a residence 
permit for five months, but papers they need for her 
to be able to join her husband in Germany are still 
missing. She would have to go to Baghdad to obtain 
the marriage certificate. But that “requires a lot of 
money and time”.
* name changed
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   \  Socio-economic and class differences, among 
DPs as well as local residents, are in most cases 
predictive of people’s ability to adapt to the 
new context but are often concealed by ethnic, 
religious or cultural group identities.
   \  Displacement has a transformative potential 
as it can open up livelihood options which 
would not have been accessible otherwise. 
However, it also blocks livelihood options as it 
contributes to the devaluation or loss of assets 
and the loss of access to previous options 
(healthcare, education, income, land, etc.).  
The transformative potential also extends to 
changing gender roles and socio-cultural 
norms through living in different cultural  
contexts, which increases heterogeneity upon 
return.
Recommendations for action:
   \  Assess carefully the potential for social cohesion  
before starting related programmes and opt for  
measures with indirect positive effects if in doubt  
(for instance improving economic framework condi-
tions for (re)integration or access to services for all). 
Causes and trajectories of displacement of any 
groups of people in protracted displacement 
need to be taken into consideration before 
drawing any conclusions about social cohesion. 
   \  Consider pre-existing conflicts among DPs and  
adjust camp and settlement arrangements in a way 
that safeguards protection and unbiased conflict  
mediation. To guarantee the protection and safety 
of DPs’, conflict and inter-group dynamics need 
to be analysed continuously. The set-up of 
camps and settlements must be such that acts 
of violence, harassment or revenge can be 
prevented. 
   \  Account for the target groups’ diversity in all  
matters of representation and participation.  
Projects applying participatory approaches or 
aiming to strengthen the political self-deter-
mination of DPs need to be based on a thorough 
understanding of the diversity of interests and 
possible fault lines among the target group(s).
De facto local integration has been defined as a 
“process where refugee individuals or groups estab-
lish belonging at the local level (which makes it  
dependent on) the relationship between refugees and 
the host population in the locality they inhabit” 
(Kuch, 2016, p. 474; cf. also Bakewell 2000; Jacobsen 
2001). In applying the perspective of established– 
outsider figurations, the research revealed that neither 
DPs (as the ‘outsiders’/newcomers) nor local residents 
(as ‘the established’/‘hosts’) are homogenous and 
static social entities. Local inhabitants may also 
belong to marginalised groups and have experienced 
disruptions of their livelihood, violent conflict, or 
may have a history as DP themselves. Yet, across  
contexts, receiving communities play a crucial role 
in hosting and supporting DPs, many of whom find 
shelter in local people’s private homes or religious in-
stitutions. This section presents the research findings 
regarding the various boundaries and cleavages, both 
within and between groups of DPs and local residents, 
returnees and people staying put and highlights how 
social interaction and group relations shape liveli-
hood options (Box 6). The chapter will first point out 
the role of (a) heterogeneity/diversity and then of (b) 
social and intergroup relations.
Diversity: Key insights
   \  Groups of displaced persons from the same 
country are usually heterogeneous and can be 
deeply divided along boundary lines predeter-
mined by the conflict that made them flee or 
political repression in the country of origin, 
fostering hostility and suspicion among them. 
Some DPs may be perpetrators of armed vio-
lence, including security forces of the govern-
ment who may continue to pose a threat after 
displacement.
   \  Traumatising experiences, impunity for perpe-
trators and a lack of (trusted) transitional jus-
tice processes harm social cohesion and inhibit 
trustful social relations during displacement 
and after return. 
Empirical findings: Social relations
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Protected  
rather than Protracted
strengthening refugees and peace
BICC research project (2015–2018) funded by  
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation  
and Development (BMZ) in the framework  
of its Special Initiative “Tackling the root causes  
of displacement, reintegrating refugees”
Caught in Myanmar’s persisting armed conflicts 
Shaw*, 25 years old,  
farmer, northern Shan
“The conflict has torn my family apart. My father died. 
As village leader, the Palaung tasked him to assemble 
the boys in the village so that they could recruit them 
forcibly. He volunteered for me. He was shot”, Shaw 
remembers. Each year, ten men per village had to be 
recruited and a donation made. Normally, the villag-
ers would hide or sleep outside the village all night, 
but this time the gunmen came and surprised them. 
The prolonged conflict determines the life of the  
families in the region north of Lashio in every re-
spect. “The fighting has been on the increase for two 
years. Since they do not have the means, the civilian 
population cannot flee”, Shaw explains. A multitude 
of competing armed groups haunts the area where 
Shaw lives. With some—like the SSA (Southern Shan 
Army)—one can buy oneself out. “It depends on your 
prosperity. If you have money, you can move to the 
city”, Shaw explains. Since they can’t afford it, many 
villagers still wait. Those villagers who were displaced 
and fled, ending up in camps inside or outside  
Myanmar, have to get by without any help. 
“We have no other choice”. His sister lives and  studies 
in the nearby town. He went to China as a migrant 
worker to finance her studies. “But the pay is getting 
worse and worse, so I no longer go there”. As cross-
ing the border has become increasingly difficult, Shaw 
now goes to the even more fiercely contested jade 
zone around Hpakan (Myanmar). “There, it is even 
more dangerous”, but informal workers earn a lot of 
money by extracting the mineral from the abandoned 
mines by using simple tools, such as hammers.
The compulsory levies and recruitments, as well  
as hardly any chance of taking the products to the 
markets, take their toll. Avoidance strategies and  
alternatives are limited. “Two of my brothers are in 
the monastery because the armed groups cannot 
fetch them from there”, Shaw says. The villagers can 
only help each other through labour: “They help with 
working the fields and harvesting”. 
Shaw says that conflict is not really the main problem: 
“My problem is how to make money—and we don’t 
have many options. That’s why I’ll go back to the 
mines when my sister takes time off and can take  
care of the house”.
* name changed
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Recommendations for action:
   \  Make sure that assistance is perceived as fair and  
unbiased by DPs/returnees and local residents.  
(De facto) local integration takes place within 
and through the immediate social context that 
DPs live in. Any kind of assistance and support 
provided needs to make sure that it does not 
disturb the delicate balance of social relations 
and intergroup perceptions. It should factor  
in possible social obligations owed by the DPs 
to local inhabitants, having received their sup-
port as well as potential grievances or envy by 
local residents over (perceived) preferential 
treatment of DPs. These would include indirect 
effects on their livelihood, e.g. from cash-for-
rent programmes or food aid for DPs.
   \  Support local social or entrepreneurial activities in 
which displaced or returnees, as well as local residents, 
participate. These may be construction, farming 
and infrastructure projects as part of commu-
nity development programmes that benefit 
DPs and local residents equally. Involve groups 
of DPs and the local community in planning 
and implementing the project from the outset. 
   \  Make reintegration processes inclusive, i.e. consider-
ing returning IDPs, refugees and disarmed former 
fighters equally, where possible. For this to be suc-
cessful, returnees should not be placed in dif-
ferent categories with different benefits as this 
may raise resentment by those—local residents 
or returnees—who receive less or no aid or 
compensation (in case of DDR often the civil-
ian victims). 
   \  Accompany reintegration with reconciliation, repara-
tions and community development programmes for 
several years upon an initial agreement with local 
representatives. To overcome the resentment of 
civilians against former fighters and prevent 
revenge, the reconciliation process must con-
tinue, covering urban and rural inhabitants as 
well as returnees, involve independent civil  
society organisations and be linked with devel-
opment that includes disadvantaged social 
groups. 
Social and intergroup relations:  
Key insights 
   \  Social relations and networks, particularly 
between DPs and local residents, often provide 
constitutive framework conditions that shape 
DPs’ livelihood opportunities, either by open-
ing and facilitating livelihood options or by 
closing them down.
   \  While adverse circumstances like a hostile po-
litical climate or economic distress can harm 
social relations and the ability or readiness of 
local residents to accommodate and support 
DPs, there are many instances where social 
networks and relations open up opportunities 
beyond the legal and political constraints  
imposed by the respective governments.
   \  Factors facilitating solidarity and hospitality 
towards DPs are ethnolinguistic or religious 
commonalities or similarities and experiences 
of violence and displacement among local resi-
dents. Supportive relations can deteriorate over 
time, mostly due to external factors (economic, 
political, aid-related, absolute scarcity of vital 
resources, or the specific positionality of the 
local residential community within the larger 
society). However, relations can also improve 
over time.
   \  Upon return, DPs may face rejection or suspi-
cion simply based on the fact that they spent 
the years of the armed conflict elsewhere.  
Violent conflicts often trigger new identity  
dynamics and can prevent return to the place 
of origin due to a changed ethnic balance or 
perception thereof. Moreover, the years spent 
in displacement can change people’s socio- 
cultural norms and behaviour, which can 
make reintegration challenging.
   \  The situation of ‘returnees’ born in exile makes 
it all the more clear that return is a new begin-
ning rather than ‘going home’. The situation of 
former combatants who can no longer face the 
communities they came from due to the war 
crimes they committed shows that return is 
not an option for everyone.
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Consequently, two new instruments started in 
two of the case study regions while this project was 
ongoing (2015–2018) and will most likely have a con-
siderable impact on the international refugee regime 
in the future. Although these examples go beyond our 
initial research questions, they provide insights and 
lessons learned regarding practical steps to improve 
refugee protection and hence are highly relevant: 
Jordan e.g. illustrates the challenges local integration 
is facing and is a rare case where the practices of local 
integration have been altered due to international 
 interventions (research question II). The case study 
on the impact of the EU–Jordan Compact in Jordan 
provided some conclusions regarding its planning, 
implementation and opportunities for improvement. 
The case study in Tanzania analysed the pilot phase 
of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework 
(CRRF). It examined why Tanzania as one of the pilot 
countries of the CRRF decided to opt out of the pro-
cess in 2018. The study provided valuable lessons on 
how to avoid this from happening in the future by 
putting more emphasis on the analysis of the national 
context of the partner country. The following para-
graphs provide a brief overview of the establishment 
of the respective new refugee regime. 
The EU–Jordan Compact (2016)
The EU–Jordan Compact aims to increase the 
share of Syrian DPs in formal employment and to 
make them agents of development. Accordingly, the 
Compact was to create 200,000 additional jobs for  
Syrians without detrimental effects on the job situa-
tion for Jordanians. Subsequently, Syrians got permis-
sion to apply for work permits, but only for a limited 
number of sectors (farming, construction or manu-
facturing). These are the sectors where they mostly 
compete with labour migrants from North Africa or 
South-East Asia and not with Jordanians (Grawert, 
2019c). The European Union provided the Jordanian 
government with financial assistance to create these 
additional jobs and used this as a lever towards in-
tensifying economic cooperation and trade 
The rise in total numbers of displaced, but the  
increase and increased duration of protracted dis-
placement and the realisation that the international 
refugee protection regime has not done enough to 
overcome those, in particular, (see Annex) has given 
rise to major attempts at reforming it in recent years. 
In 2016, seven international meetings and the UN 
Summits for Refugees and Migrants were held to 
identify better responses to forced displacement. The 
UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration 
on Refugees on 19 September 2016. As the initial plan 
to adopt a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing 
for Refugees did not find enough support among the 
member states (Schmalz, 2017), the General Assembly 
endorsed the Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF). The Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR) and the ‘Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration’ were adopted in December 2018. The GCR 
aims to complement the CRRF and envisages better 
‘burden-sharing’ between states and more participation 
by displacement-affected communities in planning, 
among other points. It is meant to complement, but 
not replace the Geneva Refugee Convention. Its scope 
is hence limited to those DPs who meet the criteria 
of the refugee definition according to the Geneva 
Convention. During the negotiations for the GCR,  
the CRRF was piloted in about a dozen countries.  
The experiences were fed back into the compact 
negotiations. 
The World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 focused 
on the often problematised gap between humanitarian 
and development assistance. Subsequently, large-
scale humanitarian-development partnerships were 
launched, such as the ‘Grand Bargain’, besides fund-
ing initiatives to provide concessional financing to 
middle-income countries hosting large refugee popu-
lations (CGD-IRC, 017, xi). One tangible outcome of 
these initiatives is the new instrument of refugee 
compacts, by which governments of high-income 
countries like the EU member states are to support 
middle-income refugee-hosting countries like Jordan 
through economic cooperation and trade liberalisa-
tion (Grawert, 2018a).
Lessons learned: International interventions and  
reform of the refugee regime
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rights are often not granted, especially in the desig-
nated zones. For women, living in dormitories close 
to the factories or travelling long distances to work 
every day is even less of an option. They prefer to run 
small home-based businesses. However, a regulation 
in 2017 which aimed to include informal trades into 
the formal economy criminalised these home-busi-
nesses, which resulted in the fact that small entre-
preneurs have since faced a constant threat of shut-
down, fines or being relocated to camps as a 
punishment, ultimately having to rely on humanitar-
ian assistance. Furthermore, the Compact did not 
consider that a large number of displaced Syrians 
(different from labour migrants) are either not of 
working age or not fit for work, because many suf-
fered from trauma, illnesses or disabilities. The need 
for medical and psychological treatment among the 
refugee population was underestimated and the as-
sumptions about the share of ‘ready-to-work’ refu-
gees too high. The goal to increase the number of Syr-
ians in formal employment has eclipsed the aim to 
improve working conditions. 
Take-away 1: The design and preparation of the 
EU–Jordan Compact did not include an assessment of 
the needs, priorities, skills and capacities of the Syrian 
DPs, but was driven by an interest of EU member 
states and the Jordanian government to conclude a 
deal with mutual benefits. The inclusion and partici-
pation of the main target groups (Syrian refugees and 
Jordanian employers) could have led to a more realis-
tic basis for decision-making and taken into account 
the needs and vulnerabilities, skills and priorities of 
the DPs as well as the nature of the Jordanian labour 
market.
Take-away 2: With its focus on having Syrian refu-
gees in formal employment, the Compact introduced 
a preferential treatment of Syrians over labour mi-
grants from other countries. This created disadvan-
tages and grievances on the side of the latter. The  
related attempt to formalise small businesses shut 
down a vital livelihood option for Syrian women. A 
more systems-based, inclusive context analysis con-
ducted beforehand would have helped to avoid such 
harmful implications.        
liberalisation. In 2018, a relaxation of criteria and the 
extension of preferential trade relations to 2030 were 
agreed upon (Grawert, 2019a). Other adaptations to 
the Compact referred to work permits: Work permits 
for all jobs open to non-Jordanians were now granted 
independent of individual employers in agriculture 
and construction, where seasonal work is very fre-
quent, and fees were waived (Grawert, 2019a).
Three years into the Compact, neither the targeted 
employment numbers nor the inclusion of a sufficient 
number of Jordanian companies into preferential 
trade agreements have been achieved. Only four com-
panies qualified for the relaxed trade regime, and 
they together employed less than 300 Syrian refugees. 
Only the number of work permits issued in total is 
known, but as this figure includes both first permits 
and many extensions, the total number of Syrians 
who have been granted a work permit is unknown. 
Reasons for the slow onset of any effect lie in the  
design of the Compact: Two-thirds of the products 
which Jordan exports are excluded from the deal, and 
those that are part of it are not competitive interna-
tionally (Grawert, 2019a). Moreover, companies failed 
to become eligible for the relaxation of the trade  
regime as one condition was to employ at least 30 per 
cent Jordanians, whereas most workers in the desig-
nated economic zones are immigrants. The Compact 
also ignored the realities of the Jordanian labour 
market, namely that it is stratified into a formal 
economy that mainly consists of the huge public  
sector that provides employment for most Jordanians 
and the migrant and informal economies. The Com-
pact did not succeed in breaking up this structure 
(Grawert, 2019c).
Highly-skilled Syrians (often in medicine, educa-
tion or business management) are not allowed to 
work in these professions in Jordan. For them, work-
ing in a factory in the designated economic zones, far 
from their families and for low pay is not attractive. 
Many prefer to work in the informal economy where 
they do not have to pay for a work permit and insur-
ance. Despite work permits, the conditions of formal 
employment are not necessarily better than in infor-
mal jobs. Wages are low, social security and labour 
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communication about terms and the implementa-
tion of the GCR and CRRF to be top-down and very 
rigid, leaving no space for feedback or modification. 
Indications for a lack of commitment of the Tanzanian 
government to the CRRF process were ignored (Rudolf, 
2019a). The ‘dialogue’ between the Tanzanian govern-
ment and the UN failed to agree on the goals of CRRF 
implementation in Tanzania. Due to perceived con-
tradictions between domestic political goals and the 
CRRF, the Tanzanian government became disillu-
sioned with the process. In early 2018, the government 
of Tanzania declared its decision to withdraw from 
the CRRF implementation process. At the time of 
writing, Tanzania was the only country that had taken 
this decision.
The way the international community treated 
the government of Tanzania linked the refugee issue 
inside Tanzania to questions of national sovereignty 
that the government then defended against interna-
tional paternalism. This political issue contributed to 
the rise of anti-refugee sentiment in Tanzania, thus 
counteracting the aim of refugee protection. Moreover, 
the CRRF focused on the situation in the refugee 
camps and disregarded urban self-settled refugees. 
Rather than combating the discrimination of refugees, 
the process curbed the freedom of movement for ref-
ugees and eliminated the legal grey zone that allowed 
self-settled urban DPs an existence outside of the  
restricted camp settings (Rudolf, 2019a).
Take-away 1: Interventions (including those at the 
highest levels like the CRRF) need to analyse and 
consider the socio-structural context, e.g. under-
standings and practices of local integration, the dif-
ferent settings refugees find themselves in and to  
anticipate how the intervention may impact on each 
group of DPs including self-settled and irregular ones.
Take-away 2: International dialogues on refugee 
protection need to take conflicts of interest between 
receiving and non-receiving countries seriously.  
Negotiations need to aim for true participation, espe-
cially of the most concerned. While the language of 
the Compacts, as well as the New York Declaration, 
emphasises a multi-stakeholder and whole-of-society 
approach, the preparatory negotiations regarding the 
implementation process lacked those elements.
Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF) Pilot Tanzania
Tanzania has received a great number of refugees 
since independence and used to be a safe haven for 
refugees from Rwanda, Mozambique, South Africa 
and Burundi for decades. After the change in govern-
ment in 2015, the new president advocated for a 
stronger focus on regional alliances and independ-
ence from Western donors. As the Global Compact on 
Refugees (GCR) and the CRRF aim to ease the pres-
sure on receiving countries by a multi-stakeholder 
approach and improved refugee self-reliance, both 
Tanzania and Uganda volunteered to become CRRF 
implementation pilot countries. The way the CRRF 
and GRC were announced raised high expectations 
among refugee-receiving countries, as they were pre-
sented as the ‘New Deal’ for better burden-sharing. 
However, there was little substance behind these 
claims, as both the Framework and the Compact are 
non-binding (Rudolf, 2019a). Claims to follow a 
whole-of-society approach were juxtaposed by the  
de facto lack of consultation with the lower levels of 
government. “Local, district and regional authorities—
those who respond to refugees on a daily basis” 
(Thomas, 2017, p. 70) were left out, as well as refugees 
themselves. According to observers, there was no 
“truly open dialogue” i.e. without power asymmetries, 
and the different starting points and interests of the 
negotiating partners were not acknowledged (Rudolf, 
2019a). 
A dispute about payments for the naturalisation 
programme had preceded the CRRF pilot phase. The 
Tanzanian government expected financial support 
from international donors who rejected the claim  
because the government had not yet fulfilled 
agreed-upon conditions. The clear stance adopted by 
the Tanzanian government on receiving a debt reduc-
tion was ignored when the World Bank offered a loan 
to cover the cost of the refugee protection in the 
country. Tanzanian officials repeatedly stressed that 
they saw refugee protection as an international  
responsibility and were not willing to take a loan  
to pay for it (Rudolf, 2019a). Not only the Tanzanian 
government, but even UN officials perceived the 
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development cooperation can achieve a lot in im-
proving livelihood options and chances for sustainable 
reintegration. Our research highlighted examples, for 
example in Uganda, where thanks to assistance that 
was made available to DPs and local residents and 
targeted towards establishing long-term structures 
to improve the availability of public services, living 
conditions of the local population have improved, 
which at the same time helps to foster supportive  
inter-group relations. Thus, guided by the aim to widen 
people’s options and with an eye to supporting estab-
lished livelihood strategies and fostering good com-
munity relations, development cooperation can make 
a big difference. 
Similarly, upon return, the framework conditions 
and how they will affect an individual’s safety and 
livelihood options upon return form the main basis 
for decision-making. Displaced persons interviewed 
in neighbouring countries of their country of origin 
for this project described how they first fled their 
homes when impacts of violence and fighting started 
to affect them and their families directly (hoping to 
be able to return soon) but left the country when 
hope for return vanished and survival became in-
creasingly difficult as IDPs due to a lack of livelihood 
opportunities and perspectives. For return and rein-
tegration to be sustainable, the following needs to be 
kept in mind: People should be allowed to wait until 
not only until the immediate causes to escape (such 
as armed fighting, forced recruitment by armed ac-
tors, an oppressive and violent regime) have changed 
but also until the framework conditions allow a  
decent livelihood, which is a complex and long-term 
process that can, again, be supported by development 
cooperation. 
Approaches to fostering self-reliance of displaced 
persons should also aim to overcome the distinction 
between local integration and reintegration—classi-
cally considered two different durable solutions—and 
to lift the multiple constraints that prevent people 
from building strong and resilient trans-local net-
works, for instance especially constraints on people’s 
legal mobility and opportunities of making a living 
Our findings on the questions when and under 
what conditions DPs are protected and how and 
when their (re)integration is successful indicate that 
context and framework conditions play an essential 
role. The understanding of agency applied through-
out this research, which includes a person’s position-
ality and thus individual exposure to larger social 
and structural constraints as factors that influence 
the ability to act, allowed us to combine the analysis 
of livelihood and coping strategies with that of pro-
cesses of exclusion and marginalisation that DPs are 
exposed to. Despite remarkable resilience and—of-
ten—the support and solidarity by receiving commu-
nities, most displaced persons are unable to over-
come the impacts of forced displacement due to 
unfavourable framework conditions and systematic 
legal and political exclusion. Most DPs, returnees and 
marginalised local residents suffering from a lack of 
or highly volatile access to basic livelihood-sustaining 
resources also suffer from social and political exclusion 
and tend to be cut-off from international assistance. 
Different dimensions of (non-)access are entangled 
with each other and add up to multiple exclusions. 
These findings confirm that the deprivation from one 
asset can never be seen in isolation from other depri-
vations, as has been conceived in the notion of access 
as a ‘bundle of powers’ and as being structured by 
power relations, which has been included in the  
analytical framework of this project. (Re)integration, 
and even de facto (re)integration can, therefore, not 
just be seen as an attribute of an individual or a state 
to be achieved by an individual. It is highly dependent 
on the context, which includes a lot more than simply 
(un-)available resources and services: It entails the 
entire social and political framework e.g. of frag-
mented land rights, political inertia, power struggles 
over access, etc. Because a lot of protracted displace-
ment crises occur in already poor and marginalised 
areas, displaced persons share experiences of exclu-
sion, hardship and lack of rights with many of the  
local residents, who are citizens but equally not inte-
grated. These structural framework conditions of  
protracted displacement are in fact a field in which 
Conclusion
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The social context of displacement and return, 
and social relations in general, have emerged as com-
mon themes across all aspects of protracted displace-
ment discussed in this Report. There has been little 
research on the impact of forced displacement on  
social relations, and where it exists, it focusses on  
interactions and relations between DPs and receiving 
societies, not on the dynamics within these commu-
nities, or between returnees and those who stayed  
behind (Berry & Roberts, 2018). Equally, the influence 
of social context and social relations on the livelihood 
of the displaced have not been studied systematically. 
The data that was collected in the context of this  
project can be summed up in two broad strands: 
1\ Rather than assuming the existence of pre-defined 
social groups and studying their interactions or 
figurations, one needs to acknowledge that “the 
displaced” as well as “receiving communities”  
or societies (and equally returnees and stayees) 
are in most cases politically, socio-economically, 
ethnically and legally (in terms of legal entitle-
ments) fragmented and diverse. Identities and 
abroad. Local integration and reintegration are, in 
fact, not mutually exclusive at all, as successful local 
integration is the best precondition for successful re-
integration or the establishment of a trans-local ap-
proach to sustaining one’s livelihood. 
Attempts to open up migration channels for  
refugees reach back quite a few years. In 2008, a  
discussion paper prepared for UNHCR suggested that 
refugees could be “admitted to migrant worker and 
immigration programmes” (UNHCR, 2008, quoted in 
Long, 2014, p. 479). Similarly, a suggestion that reset-
tlement states could open parallel channels for “suit-
ably qualified refugees” was made in the context of 
Annual Tripartite Consultations on resettlement in 
Geneva. However, so far these initiatives—even 
though strongly backed by research indicating the 
importance of migration and mobility as a livelihood 
strategy of displaced persons—have remained on  
paper (Long, 2014, p. 479). The Global Refugee Compact, 
which also emphasises the importance of opening up 
channels for legal migration, has a new opportunity 
to follow this up with concrete actions (Box 2).
   \  Circular processes of recurring violence and forced displacement have become frequent. Development aid, therefore, needs to 
adjust its planning regarding the duration and instruments of programmes accordingly.
   \  Protracted displacement requires long-term approaches, and the traditional bilateral framework needs to be complemented by intensified 
multilateral and multi-stakeholder cooperation with international humanitarian actors and transition assistance (Übergangs-
hilfe) while the triple nexus of humanitarian–development–peace needs to be strengthened.  
   \  Reconciliation and the rule of law have been identified as important prerequisites for reintegration. Accordingly, reconciliation efforts 
and programmes strengthening the rule of law need to be linked up more closely to reintegration measures. 
   \  A holistic approach that includes receiving communities, stayees and returnees and, where applicable, ex-combatants and civilian victims 
of war avoids exclusion, doing harm and social tension. Trajectories, needs and vulnerabilities of refugees, IDPs, migrants and 
other mobile population groups overlap as their status changes frequently. 
   \  The presence of displaced persons in camps needs to be strictly limited to a few months before being either transferred  
to settlements, other sites of (partial) local integration or any durable solution. Aid must be delivered along an area/needs-based 
approach rather than a vulnerability approach that positively discriminates beneficiaries (e.g. based on the criteria of  
vulnerability or gender). 
   \  Analysis and aid projects must address displacement as a regional and cross-border challenge. Projects need to take multiple movements, 
repeated border crossings of displaced persons as well as spill over effects of political events in the region into account. Any aid 
measures in situations of protracted displacement need to be contextualised to avoid unintended consequences. 
   \  Dependencies need to be prevented and resilience strengthened by building upon existing capacities and livelihood 
strategies. To identify these, empirical bottom-up assessment and studies that reach beyond the group of beneficiaries  
are necessary. Focussing exclusively on vulnerabilities is detrimental to fostering capacities, assets, networks and transnational  
options of displaced persons. 
Box 2
General recommendations for development action in displacement situations 
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group interactions are dynamic: Armed conflicts, 
living apart or living in different social and  
cultural surroundings for a long time change 
boundaries, identity narratives and perceptions, 
ways of being perceived, as well as values and  
behaviours, thereby adding to pre-existing 
boundaries. Group identities and their boundaries 
need to be established empirically in each con-
text, and it needs to be acknowledged that they 
are dynamic and subject to change over time.
2\ Social and inter-group relations have a major 
impact on livelihood options during protracted 
displacement and return. In a positive sense, they 
are often mediated by pre-existing community 
ties or a history of displacement of the local  
residents, thus depend very much on where  
displaced people settle within a country. In a  
negative sense, livelihood options can easily be 
overshadowed by political events, economic hard-
ships or unequal access to opportunities or aid. 
While the perspective of the established–outsider 
figuration opened up relevant research avenues, 
especially regarding mutual and self-perceptions 
and general interaction patterns between and 
within groups, the contexts under study were too 
large and too complex to narrow the reasons for 
power differentials between groups down to a 
single factor like social cohesion (Bohnet & 
Schmitz-Pranghe, 2019). Patterns of established–
outsider figurations were usually overlaid and  
coincided with other boundary-creating factors, 
like income inequalities or legal status 
differences. 
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(Jacobsen, 2001), people fleeing from armed struggles 
against colonialism and Apartheid experienced a lot 
of solidarity (Rutinwa, 2002). When wars were over, 
voluntary return as a right and as a choice was quite 
commonly practiced until around 3.5 million DPs  
returned within Africa before and during the 1970s  
(Rogge, 1991). 
UNHCR assisted countries with large refugee  
inflows upon their request. The 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees lifted the geographical (on 
persons displaced from within Europe) and temporal 
(on persons displaced before 1951) restrictions of the 
Geneva Convention (White, 2019, p. 108), and the Con-
vention became potentially globally applicable. Even 
though the problem of territorial access to countries 
offering asylum and safety for refugees was well-
known, a regulation on territorial access to asylum 
suggested in the same year was never adopted. Due to 
this gap in refugee law, the principle of non-refoule-
ment (forbidding the return of people seeking protec-
tion to any country where they could be at risk of  
persecution) that applies already at the border can be 
bypassed through externalised and outsourced border 
controls (Schmalz, 2017, p. 11f.). Also in the 1960s, the 
political separation of refugee and migrant identities 
became more clear, initially meant to ensure refugees’ 
humanitarian protection, but in practice rather con-
strained their mobility (Long, 2014, p. 480).
During the 1970s and 1980s, the prolonged con-
flicts in Indochina, Afghanistan, Central America, the 
Horn of Africa, and southern Africa displaced mil-
lions; the global refugee population tripled from 
three to ten millions between 1977 and 1982 (Milner & 
Loescher, 2011, p. 7). In the 1970s, protracted refugee 
crises became a tangible phenomenon of global pro-
portions (Milner & Loescher, 2011). Due to rising num-
bers of refugees and economic recession, Western 
states went for more restrictive refugee policies, and 
many countries of first asylum followed their model 
in a downward spiral of mutual non-compliance 
with international principles (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). 
With the end of the Cold War, the global context 
changed significantly. Conflicts became increasingly 
protracted, more governments failed in their protec-
tive roles to uphold the rights of citizens or even 
 Historical emergence of protracted 
displacement in the context of the 
changing refugee regime
The international refugee regime, and with it 
the concept of the three durable solutions, emerged 
against the background of the two World Wars in  
Europe. However, the way refugees are treated under 
it has undergone paradigmatic shifts in previous 
decades. In Europe’s inter-war phase, between 1922 
and 1938, the League of Nations issued “stateless  
persons passports” that became known as Nansen 
passports to facilitate migration of otherwise state-
less and trapped displaced persons, initially to state-
less persons of Russian origin, later also to Armenian, 
Assyrian and Turkish refugees. By 1938, the Nansen 
passport was recognised by 52 states and had been  
issued to some 450,000 people. ILO was actively sup-
porting refugees providing vocational training and 
facilitating employment opportunities after World 
War I (Barbelet & Wake, 2017, p. 20).
After the end of World War II, the number of  
displaced people was the largest throughout the 20th 
century. Only five per cent of those registered as refu-
gees after World War II, however, returned to where 
they had fled from; the International Refugee Organ-
isation, and after 1951 the newly founded UN Refugee 
Agency UNHCR, focussed on finding resettlement  
options in third countries for them (Kleist, 2015).  
According to UNHCR’s statute, its task was to seek 
“permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by 
assisting Governments […] to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation 
within new national communities”.
During the Cold War, influential Western coun-
tries continued to practice generous resettlement 
programmes according to their foreign policy inter-
ests so that in many cases, countries of first asylum 
were happy to accommodate refugees, since they 
knew that in most cases this would be of a temporary 
nature (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). Western countries gen-
erally granted asylum as a right to permanent resi-
dency (Bradley, 2013, p. 1; Jacobsen, 2001). In the African 
context, local integration was less commonly sup-
ported, but self-settlement was widely permitted, 
without assistance but also without any constraints 
Annex
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2001; Chimni, 1999), which has become more restricted, 
leading to the creation of refugee camps and restric-
tion on refugees’ freedom of movement and possibili-
ties to integrate locally since the late 1980s (Milner & 
Loescher, 2011, p. 4). The decade of voluntary repatria-
tion, accordingly, resulted in large-scale repatriations 
of refugees (around nine million between 1991 and 
1996 according to UNHCR data quoted in Milner & 
Loescher, 2011, p. 7), often before the causes of dis-
placement had been overcome. As a result, many  
returnees ended up internally displaced or had to flee 
again (Black, 2006). Accordingly, in the early 2000s, 
protracted refugee crises became more prominent  
on the international and UNHCR agenda. Individual 
receiving countries moved away from the practice of 
“isolated and insecure refugee camps” towards more 
local integration (Milner & Loescher, 2011), academics 
tried to revive the “forgotten solution” of local inte-
gration (for example Jacobsen, 2001), but in the con-
text of the ‘global war on terror’ after 9-11 2001, refu-
gees were increasingly framed as a security threat 
and viewed with suspicion (Hyndman & Giles, 2017), 
prolonging their status as outsiders and undermin-
ing such efforts in many places.
Looking at the causes of the increasing number 
and extent of protracted displacement crises, one  
for sure is the changed nature and protracted nature 
of conflicts today. Conflicts today last a lot longer on 
average than they did a few decades back, around 13 
years, and they have no clear beginning or end. They 
erupt again and again, even after a peace deal has 
been struck (CGD-IRC, 2017, p. vi). Therefore, return is 
not an option for a long time. The increased deliberate 
targeting of civilians also leads to more displacement 
(Bermudez Torres, 2005). However, the changed imple-
mentation of the international refugee regime just as 
important: The changed perception and reception of 
displaced people has created a regime of containment 
and suspicion instead of solidarity, especially in the 
Global North, but with far-reaching repercussions.  
Today, 88 per cent of refugees are received by low 
and middle-income countries, and around 76 per cent 
live outside of formal camp settings (CGD-IRC, 2017), 
often with private hosts or in communities. The con-
stellation of poor receiving countries, UNHCR in 
charge of protecting refugees and providing them 
became actively involved in causing displacements of 
their own citizens, and the motivation of displaced 
persons to return decreased (Rogge, 1991). At the same 
time, refugees’ movements increasingly mixed with 
migration movements, and refugees had lost their 
role as a geopolitical ‘bargaining chip’: The willing-
ness to receive refugees decreased globally starting 
from the Global North, the legitimacy or genuineness 
of their claims was increasingly questioned, a refugee 
status became more difficult to attain, easier to lose 
and involved ever more restrictions (Chimni, 1999). 
Due to the lack of any international regulation on 
sharing the burden and responsibility for refugees 
between states, the withdrawal of the Global North 
meant that ever-larger numbers of refugees were  
concentrated in countries with limited protection  
capacities, which were not able avoid this responsibility 
easily due to geographical proximity to armed con-
flicts: Camps and situations of protracted displace-
ment emerged (Schmalz, 2017). After the end of the 
Cold War, countries of the Global North started to  
redefine their share of the “burden” and increased  
active peacemaking and peacebuilding interventions 
with the aim to solve or prevent displacement to the 
Global South, however, without reflecting on their 
own role regarding structural causes of war and dis-
placement (Gottwald, 2014, p. 531). Since around 1985, 
so-called voluntary repatriation became the favored 
“solution” by refugee receiving countries and UNHCR, 
who in 1992 declared the “decade of voluntary repatri-
ation”. Having shifted towards promoting return, its 
voluntariness, which is enshrined in the legal principle 
of non-refoulement and part of the Geneva Convention, 
was more and more eroded. Receiving countries in 
the Global North started to create conditions under 
which return was meant to look more attractive than 
to stay; assessments about the safety of return issued 
by receiving countries’ authorities do not include as-
sessments of the displaced persons themselves, and 
objective criteria for “voluntariness” have never been 
established (Grawert, 2018). 
On the one hand, UNHCR gained legitimacy to 
expand its focus of work into areas of reintegration 
and developmental requirements for it (Macrae, 1999), 
but the emphasis on return as preferred durable solu-
tion came at the cost of local integration (Jacobsen, 
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3\ Accountability and transparency: Research should be 
transparent regarding the purposes, potential impacts 
and sources of support for research projects with rele-
vant parties affected by the research. Researchers 
must determine in advance whether their pro-
viders of information wish to remain anonymous 
or receive recognition and make every effort to 
comply with these wishes. All data gathered while 
conducting field research must be protected and 
preserved.
4\ Voluntary and informed consent: Researchers should 
obtain the voluntary and informed consent of persons or 
communities being studied in advance. This means 
that a person’s decision to participate in research 
is to be based on sufficient information about and 
adequate understanding of the proposed research, 
its purposes and methods and the implications of 
participation in it. 
5\ Agreement of the participants: The agreement of the 
participants in participatory methods is essential. The 
process of organising consent will vary according 
to the community, culture, and possibly by the 
nature of the crisis. In some cases, consent may 
be needed from more than one actor, e.g. village 
chiefs or councils, camp managers, government 
officials or parents. In organising consent, be pre-
pared that some communities may not agree to 
take part in the participatory methods.
6\ Respect and professionalism: Researchers should en-
deavour to respect the culture and customs of the com-
munities and countries they are working in. Moreover, 
they should maintain respectful and ethical  
professional relationships with the people inter-
viewed and support their empowerment and par-
ticipation rather than treat them only as objects 
of research. An open learning and sharing attitude 
should be maintained at all times.
7\ Unbiased research: Researchers should be aware of any 
possible bias of their own and others concerning gender, 
ethnicity, ability, religion, geographical location, class/
caste and sexual orientation, among others. The diverse 
make-up of groups shall be recognised and given 
proper attention. A reflection upon their signifi-
cance for the research process is mandatory.
with material goods as a surrogate state but without 
being able to grant civil rights or any form of political 
participation, and rich countries that finance UNHCR 
as their main contribution to refugee protection 
means that refugees are turned into recipients of aid 
over long periods of time (Schmalz, 2017, p. 12) and is a 
major underlying cause for the longer duration of 
displacement. It provides the context against which 
receiving low-income countries resist and constrain 
local integration as a durable solution as obviously, 
from their perspective, discussions on local integration 
initiated by the Global North are part of established 
mechanisms to shift the burden and infringe on 
their sovereignty (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 6). 
Ethical guidelines applied in this project 
Research involving refugees and vulnerable pop-
ulations pose particular ethical challenges. These  
include ethical considerations12 when developing the 
research designs, the relationship between research, 
practice and policy and the responsibility towards 
the people in the field. Research should neither be 
used to further a particular political standpoint nor 
to gather sensitive information for dubious purposes 
of governments or other bodies. 
1\ Avoid causing harm: Researchers have an ethical obliga-
tion to consider and assess the potential impact of their 
research and the dissemination of the results of 
their research on all persons directly or indirectly 
involved. They shall prevent and minimise any 
negative effects of research, which can increase 
people's vulnerability to physical and psychoso-
cial risks. The safety and dignity of all involved 
persons have the utmost priority.
2\ Respect protection principles: Researchers must ensure 
that they do not harm the safety, dignity or privacy of 
people with whom they work, conduct research or 
who might reasonably be thought to be affected by 
their research. Coordination with local actors is a 
necessity.  
12 \ The guidelines developed within the project “Protected rather than 
protracted—Strengthening refugees and peace” are based on different 
ethical guidelines for field research: International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies & ICRC, 1994; American Anthropolo-
gical Association, 2009; Burke & Eichler, 2006; Actionaid, 2010.
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(BICC Working Paper series No. 1/2018), Bonn: BICC, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/BICC_Working_Pa-
per_1_2018_Myanmar.pdf
   \  Vollmer, R. (2019). Agency and livelihood-making in protracted displacement: Key insights and recommendations for development  
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Policy Briefs and Knowledge Note
   \  Bohnet, H., & Rudolf, M. (2015, October). Voluntary return of refugees: Chances for peace and sustainable development? (BICC  
Policy Brief series No. 3/2015). Bonn: BICC, https://www.bicc.de /uploads/tx_bicctools/policy_paper3_flucht_e_121115.pdf
   \  Bohnet, H. (2016, May). Return to violent conflict? Challenges of sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons to and 
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cy_Brief_2_2016.pdf
   \  Bohnet, H. (2017, June). Going beyond temporary measures. A way forward for refugee livelihood programming in southeast Turkey 
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stan_d.pdf
   \  Grawert, E. (2019, March). The EU–Jordan Compact—A model for burden-sharing in refugee crises? (BICC Policy Brief series  
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BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion  BICC
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development  BMZ
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework  CRFF
DP Displaced person DP
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  FARC
GCR Global Compact on Refugees  GCR 
IDP Internally displaced person  IDP
IRR Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction Model  IRR
PDS Protracted displacement situation  PDS
PRS Protraced refugee situation  PRS
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  UNHCR
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